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MARYLAND'S EXCHANGEABLE CHILDREN: A CRITIQUE
OF MARYLAND'S SYSTEM OF PROVIDING





Consider Lisa,' a seriously emotionally disturbed child who might
have been helped by any one of the Maryland agencies charged with
responsibility for handicapped youngsters:
(1) The Department of Education, which is required by state law
to provide or fund special education and related services for
educationally handicapped children;2
(2) The Social Services Administration, which sometimes as-
sumes the care and custody of mentally handicapped children
whose parents are unwilling or unable to care for them;3
(3) The Juvenile Services Administration, which accepts respon-
sibility for children adjudicated delinquent or in need of su-
pervision;4 or
(4) The Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Ad-
* Susan P. Leviton is an Assistant Professor at the University of Maryland School of
Law.
** Nancy B. Shuger is an Assistant Attorney General for the Maryland Department of
Human Resources. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author. This Article
was not written in her capacity as Assistant Attorney General and does not reflect the views
or official legal opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Maryland.
1. The case study of Lisa describes the experiences of a real child. The name of the
child has been changed to protect her right to confidentiality. All her records are on file in
the office of Susan Leviton.
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1975); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 8-401 to -417.6 (1978 & Supp.
1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.1-300.754 (1982).
A child may be considered handicapped under the Education for All Handicapped
Children's Act (EAHCA) and the Maryland Education Bylaws if mentally retarded, hard of
hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, or-
thopedically impaired, other health impaired, deaf-blind, multiply handicapped, or learning
disabled. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(a) (1982); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 05.01.02A (1978).
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A § 61(b) (1979 & Supp. 1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-820 (1980 & Supp. 1982).
4. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 6-109 (1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 3-820 (1980 & Supp. 1982).
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ministration5 and the Mental Hygiene Administration,'
which are responsible for some mentally retarded and men-
tally ill children.
Lisa's problems trace to her early years. She was only fifteen
months old when her father left her mother, who shortly thereafter be-
gan treatment for depression at Greater Baltimore Medical Center.7
Although a staff psychiatrist there was optimistic about Lisa, describing
her at four and one-half as "bright, intelligent, and attractive looking,"'8
by the time she was nine, her behavioral problems were severe enough
that Baltimore City Public Schools referred her to the University of
Maryland Learning and Behavior Clinic.9 At eleven, Lisa found her-
self in the custody of Social Services,'" her mother having decided that
she couldn't cope with her."
Between ages eleven and fifteen, Lisa went through two foster
homes, two residential institutions, and two temporary crisis centers,
ending up in emergency detention at Montrose, a state training
school.' 2 Although professionals who evaluated her during these years
5. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 7-501 to -507 (1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-820(g) (1980 & Supp. 1982).
6. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 10-613 to -617 (1982 & Supp. 1982); MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-820(f) (1980 & Supp. 1982).
7. Hannah More I.E.P. Conference Report (July 23, 1980); Greater Baltimore Medical
Center (G.B.M.C.) Psychiatric Evaluation (Oct. 25, 1966). Lisa never again saw nor heard
from her father. Hannah More 1.E.P. Conference Report (July 23, 1980); G.B.M.C. Progress
Notes (Nov. 1, 1966).
8. G.B.M.C. Progress Notes (June 3, 1968).
9. University of Maryland Hospital, Department of Social Work, Summary of Service
(Aug. 6, 1973).
10. Department of Social Services (DSS) Referral of Child for Purchase of Care (Sept.
22, 1978). In May, 1974, Lisa was adjudicated "dependent." A "dependent child" was a
child deprived of adequate support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from
home, or physical, mental, or emotional incapacity or disability of his parent, guardian, or
other custodian. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(L) (1974). The term "child in
need of assistance" (CINA) has replaced the term "dependent child." See infra text accom-
panying note 38 for discussion of CINA.
11. Regional Institute for Children & Adolescents (RICA) Social Services Admission
(SSA) Note (July 25, 1974).
12. In May of 1974 Lisa was placed at the Regional Institute for Children & Adoles-
cents, RICA SSA Note (July 25, 1974). She adjusted well at RICA, and in February, 1975,
she was placed in a foster home. After a month, the foster parent decided she could no
longer handle Lisa because of Lisa's emotional problems and returned her to RICA. RICA
Psychological Evaluation (Apr. 15, 1975).
In October of 1975, DSS transferred Lisa to Villa Maria, a residential treatment
center for emotionally disturbed children. DSS Child Whereabouts Sheet (Oct. 28, 1975);
DSS Notes (Oct. 30, 1975). Because Lisa was the oldest child at Villa Maria, DSS placed
her in foster care again. DSS Transfer Dictation (July 21, 1978). When this placement
failed, the Social Services' worker placed Lisa at the Fellowship of Lights, a temporary crisis
center. Letter from Fellowship of Lights to University of Maryland School of Law General
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agreed that Lisa needed a group home designed to provide a struc-
tured, therapeutic environment, no state agency ever provided such a
placement.' 3 In the meantime, Lisa's behavioral problems escalated to
the point that she frequently had violent tantrums and even attempted
to set herself on fire. 14
Following one of these tantrums, Social Services requested that
the juvenile court adjudicate Lisa a delinquent and commit her to the
custody of Juvenile Services.' 5 The juvenile court adjudicated her a
delinquent and ordered that she stay at Montrose pending a permanent
placement at Edgemeade or another suitable long-term therapeutic fa-
cility.' 6 Although Edgemeade accepted her, Juvenile Services refused
to place her there claiming that agency policy provided that the agency
fund Edgemeade only for children adjudicated "in need of supervi-
sion," not for those adjudicated "delinquent."' 7 Consequently, Lisa
stayed for nearly two years at Montrose,' 8 where her emotional condi-
tion and her behavior continued to deteriorate.' 9
At the time that Lisa was to be released, Social Services and Edu-
cation both potentially had a responsibility to Lisa. The Baltimore
Practice Clinic (Feb. 12, 1981). The staff there concluded that Lisa exhibited signs of serious
mental illness and asked that she be moved to a more appropriate institution. Fellowship of
Lights Consultative Report (Sept. 18, 1978). DSS then placed Lisa at the Neighborhood
Adolescent & Young Adult Drug Program (NAYADP). Letter from Fellowship of Lights to
University of Maryland School of Law General Practice Clinic (Feb. 12, 1981). After she
threw a temper tantrum at NAYADP, the police removed her and placed her in emergency
detention at Montrose. DSS Reconsideration (Apr., 1979).
13. The RICA psychologist described Lisa as an "outgoing friendly child" who "clearly
responds to affection and positive treatment," and recommended a structured group home.
RICA Psychological Evaluation (Apr. 15, 1975). A psychiatrist who evaluated Lisa in Octo-
ber, 1978, recommended that Lisa be placed in a well supervised and structured therapeutic
group home. Instead Lisa was placed at Montrose, a state training school for delinquents.
MCC Psychiatric Evaluation (Oct. 13, 1978). In fact, none of the evaluators' recommenda-
tions were followed in either instance.
14. Letter from Fellowship of Lights to University of Maryland School of Law General
Practice Clinic (Feb. 12, 1981).
15. In re . No. 67826510 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct., Div. for Juv. Causes (1978)).
16. Id.
17. Memo from Regional Supervisor, Dep't of Juv. Services, Juv. Ct. Services Div. to
Montrose Clinical Director (June 1, 1979).
18. The average stay for a child committed to Montrose is 6.9 months (1981) or 6.8
months (1980). JUVENILE SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (JSA) ANN. REP., 1981 Fiscal Year at
57.
19. Her behavior there was described as "disruptive," "disturbing," and "assaultive."
Her Social Services' worker stated that she was constantly screaming, yelling, and throwing
psychotic-like tantrums. The psychiatrist at Montrose explained that because Lisa seemed
depressed, and said she did not want to live, he prescribed ritalin and then mellaril. Letter
from Montrose Supervisor and Social Worker to Regional Supervisor, Dep't of Juv. Serv.,
Juv. Ct. Serv. Div. (May 24, 1979); DSS Excess Cost Summary (undated); JSA, Psychiatric
Follow-ups (Jan. 17, 1980; Sept. 14, 1979; June 4, 1979).
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City Department of Education concluded, however, that Lisa was not
emotionally disturbed, but "socially maladjusted. '20 Accordingly, Ed-
ucation claimed it had no obligation to meet her needs. Social Services
tried two more residential institutions for emotionally disturbed chil-
dren.2' Both institutions agreed that Lisa then needed more intensive
services than they could provide,22 so Brown School in Texas was sug-
gested. But the Department of Social Services had run out of money
for such placements, 23 and Education, which must fund on the basis of
need and not on the basis of its budget, still disclaimed any responsibil-
ity for Lisa.
Finally, a full year after Lisa's release from Montrose, Social Serv-
ices found the money to send her to the Brown School. 24 Shortly after-
wards, the Department of Education reversed its position, admitting
that Lisa was seriously emotionally disturbed and thus entitled to spe-
cial education and related services at the Department's expense. 25 Al-
though Education conceded that residential placement was
appropriate,26 it refused to fund Lisa's placement at Brown because the
school was not on the Department's list of approved placements. 27
Lisa still is at Brown. But her prognosis is poor, for she did not
20. Baltimore City Dep't of Educ., Notice of Proposed Placement Action (May 8, 1980).
"Socially maladjusted" is specifically excluded as a handicapping condition under 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.5(b)(8)(ii) (1982) and MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 05.01.02A(2)(h)(ii) (1978). See
infra text accompanying notes 87-94 (discussing distinction between "serious emotional dis-
turbance" and "socially maladjusted").
21. After Lisa's release from Montrose she was placed at Hannah More Center, a private
non-profit facility for emotionally disturbed children. In October, 1980, Lisa was discharged
from Hannah More and placed at the Adolescent Inpatient Unit of the Walter P. Carter
Center which is a Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) facility with inpa-
tient and outpatient services for evaluating and treating individuals with psychiatric
problems and mental retardation. Hannah More Discharge Summary (Oct. 4, 1980); DSS
Notes (Mar. 20, 1981).
22. Hannah More Psychiatric Update (Oct. 2, 1980). This report states that because of
Lisa's size and strength, the staff was unable to prevent her from hurting herself and others
during her violent outbursts. She injured Carter staffduring four separate outbursts. Letter
from Carter Center Psychologist and Director of the Adolescent Inpatient Unit to Lisa's
DSS Worker (Mar. 31, 1981).
23. Letter from Carter Center Psychologist and Director of the Adolescent Inpatient
Unit to Lisa's DSS Worker (Mar. 31, 1981). For information on excess cost placements see
infra text accompanying notes 41-44.
24. The Brown School's Treatment Plan (June 26, 1981).
25. Baltimore City Dep't of Educ. State Aid Screening Comm., Notice of Proposed
Placement Action (July 15, 1981).
26. Id. For further information on residential placements funded by Education, see in-
fra text accompanying notes 30-33.
27. Statement of the Comm. Chairman, Meeting of the Baltimore City State Aid Screen-
ing Comm. (July 15, 1981), contained in Letter from Asst. State Superintendent, Div. of
Special Educ. to University of Maryland School of Law (Aug. 14, 1981). For discussion of
different placement lists of various agencies, see infra text accompanying note 177.
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receive appropriate services when she needed them. During the nine
years that she was a ward of the state, her needs were not met; rather,
her problem escalated.
Unfortunately, Lisa's story is a typical one. Blame for this shame-
ful waste of resources-financial and human-belongs to Maryland's
system for delivering services to mentally handicapped children.
II. MARYLAND'S SYSTEM FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO MENTALLY
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN
Before analyzing the system's problems, this Article will explain
how Maryland's statutes and agency regulations allocate responsibility
for these youngsters among three state departments-the Departments
of Education, Human Resources, and Health and Mental Hygiene. Es-
sentially, the Maryland scheme makes Education responsible for all ed-
ucationally handicapped children, Human Resources responsible for
youth whose families are unwilling or unable to care for them, and
Health and Mental Hygiene responsible for delinquents as well as some
emotionally disturbed and retarded children. Thus all three depart-
ments often have overlapping obligations to mentally handicapped
children.
A. The Department of Education's Responsibility
Under Maryland law, and the federal Education for All Handi-
capped Children's Act (EAHCA), Maryland's Department of Educa-
tion must provide educationally handicapped children with free special
education and related services. 28 An emotionally disturbed or mentally
retarded child qualifies for a special education program, designed to
meet his individual needs, if his handicap adversely affects his educa-
tional performance.29 If his handicap is so severe that his needs cannot
be met in a less restrictive environment, the Department must place
him in a state-operated or non-public residential program at no cost to
his parents.3 °
Sometimes a handicapped child needs a residential placement, not
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1975); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 8-401 to -417 (1978 & Supp.
1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.121(a) (1982). See supra note 1. See generally Zirkel, Building an
Appropriate Education from Board of Education v. Rowley." Razing the Door and Raising the
Floor, 42 MD. L. REV. 466 (1983) (discussing recent developments under the Education for
All Handicapped Children's Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976 & Supp. V 1982)).
29. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 05.01.02A(l)(2) (1978).
30. 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1982) provides:
If placement in a public or private residential program is necessary to provide special
education and related services to a handicapped child, the program, including non-
medical care and room and board, must be at no cost to the parents of the child.
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for educational reasons, but because of medical, social, emotional, or
environmental factors segregable from the child's educational needs.3
If an appropriate day program is available in the child's home school
district, but the child is unable to live at home and requires residential
care because of a "home circumstance" problem, the local education
agency may contribute an amount not to exceed the cost of an appro-
priate day program in the child's home school district.3 2 When chil-
dren are in the custody of another agency and need residential
placement because of a combination of needs, the State Department of
Education may co-fund the placement with the other agencies.33
B. The Department of Human Resources' Responsibility
The Social Services Administration of the Department of Human
Resources is the "central coordinating and directing agency of all social
services ...activities in the state including .. .child welfare serv-
ices."' 34 A local department of social services (LDSS), however, will
provide residential services for a child only if the parents or guardian
voluntarily surrender custody to it35 or if a juvenile court commits a
child to it.36 The regulation governing voluntary placement gives the
LDSS considerable latitude to decide whether to accept a child.37 By
contrast, the LDSS must accept any child committed to it by the juve-
31. See infra text accompanying note 104.
32. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 05.01.06F(2)(e) (1978). Although the bylaws do not
define "home circumstances," the Maryland State Department of Education's (MSDE) in-
terpretation of the "home circumstances" provision gives the local educational agency
(LEA) discretionary authority to contribute to the cost of residential placements needed for
non-educational reasons. Memo from Martha J. Irvin, Asst. State Superintendent, Div. of
Special Educ., at 1 (Nov. 17, 1981). The LEA may contribute such funds only if there is
"evidence that demonstrates the existence of problems establishing the need for out of home
placement." Id. Such verification "should be provided to the School Committee by the
parents and an appropriate public agency responsible for the child's care." Id.
Before April 14, 1980, the MSDE was responsible for approving placements under
the home circumstances provision. 1d. at 2. Since then the local educational agencies have
had final approval for such placements. Id. See MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8-409 (1978 &
Supp. 1982).
33. The amount of money each agency pays usually is determined by the maximum rate
of Juvenile Services or Social Services. In most co-funded cases, Juvenile or Social Services
pay their maximum rate, the local education agency pays 300% of their basic cost and
MSDE pays the remaining amount. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8-417.3(d)(1), (2) (1978 &
Supp. 1982), telephone conversation with Richard Steinke, Md. State Dep't of Educ. (May
12, 1983).
34. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 3(a) (1979 & Supp. 1982).
35. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 07, § 02.11.04A (1978).
36. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-820 (1980 & Supp. 1982) (juvenile courts
have authority to commit children to local departments of social services); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 88A, §§ 61(b)(l)(i),(ii) (1979 & Supp. 1982).
37. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 07, § 02.11.04B (1978).
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nile court. Children committed to Social Services by court order are
those youngsters adjudicated "children in need of assistance," (CINA),
defined as children who are abandoned, abused, dependent, neglected,
or mentally handicapped with parents who are unable or unwilling to
care for them.38
Social Services' major child welfare service is arranging and pay-
ing for boarding care with foster families or in public group facilities. 39
Some children eligible for foster care may have handicapping condi-
tions, requiring them to be placed in private residential facilities. The
amount that Social Services pays for care in private residential facilities
is set by agency regulation, and no statute or regulation authorizes pay-
ments in excess of the established maximum.4" Social Services' practice
between 1975 and April, 1981, however, was to pay rates in excess of
those set in its regulations on behalf of children with special needs
when: a court committed the child to the custody of an LDSS for
placement in a particular residential treatment facility; the State De-
partment of Budget and Fiscal Planning approved the contract for pay-
ment; and the social, medical, and psychological evaluations
substantiated that this was the only appropriate placement for the
child.4'
Because Social Services projected a deficit of $750,000 for the
fiscal year 1981 and $350,000 for 1982, it revised its excess-cost policies
effective April 10, 198 1.42 Under the new policies, the total number of
excess-cost placements is to be frozen at the April, 1981, level, but chil-
dren already in excess-cost care and committed by court order to a
38. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(e), (p) (1980 & Supp. 1982); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 88A, § 61(b)(1)(i) (1979 & Supp. 1982).
39. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 60 (1979 & Supp. 1982). Boarding care may include
support services needed to maintain the child in the foster family or facility. MD. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 07, § 02.11.02A(2) (1978). Social Services also provides emergency foster care on a
temporary basis for abused and abandoned children. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 07, § 02.11.02B
(1978).
40. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 32C (1979). The Department of Education, on the other
hand, has no maximum payment for purchase of care in private residential facilities. See
infra note 70 and accompanying text.
41. This policy was embodied in Department of Human Resources Circular Letter No.
80-24 (Mar. 25, 1980). This agency practice generated the term "excess-cost cases," as the
Department of Human Resources (DHR) informally refers to those multiply handicapped
children whose educational, treatment, and social service needs require placements in facili-
ties that charge in excess of the maximum rate allowed by agency regulations.
42. The rising number of children needing this care, as well as the cost of such care,
precipitated this funding crisis. In 1980 the average cost per child was $27.000: in 1981 it
rose to $31,000. As of April 10, 1981, 62 children were in "excess-cost" placements funded
by the DHR. DHR Circular Letter No. 81-25 at 2 (Apr. 10, 1981).
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LDSS are to remain in their current placements. 43 Social Services will
not approve any new excess-cost placement, and will appeal any court
order for such placement, unless all other options for care have been
explored and rejected and the LDSS has made substantial efforts to
negotiate appropriate placements with other state agencies.'
C. The Department of Health & Mental Hygiene's Responsibility
The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene includes three ad-
ministrations which may provide services to handicapped children:
The Juvenile Services Administration, the Mental Hygiene Adminis-
tration, and the Mental Retardation/Developmental Disabilities
Administration.45
1. Juvenile Services Administration-Juvenile Services Adminis-
tration is the central administrative agency for juvenile intake, deten-
tion authorization, investigation, probation, protective supervision, and
after-care services. 46 It has statutory responsibility for developing pro-
grams to serve pre-delinquent children as well as for the state's juvenile
institutions devoted to diagnosis, training, detention, and rehabilita-
tion.47 Moreover, Juvenile Services is supposed to provide services as
requested by the juvenile court.48 Specifically, it is empowered to act as
a custodian or guardian for children committed to it by the juvenile
court; 49 establish and maintain public facilities for children;5" and place
children in, and purchase services from, private facilities including
those outside Maryland when adequate services are not available
within the state.5
The statutes outlining Juvenile Services' functions do not clearly
delineate the kinds of children it is required to serve. In practice, Juve-
nile Services deals with children adjudicated delinquent or "children in
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene also includes the Medical Assist-
ance Program and Crippled Children's Services Division of the Mental Retarda-
tion/Developmental Disabilities Administration (MR/DDA), which also are involved with
handicapped children. For purposes of this Article, however, the discussion is limited to
those administrations to which the juvenile court commits children.
46. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 6-109(a) (1982).
47. Id. at § 6-109(a),(b).
48. Id. at § 6-126.
49. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-820(b)(2) (1980 & Supp. 1982).
50. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 6-116(a) (1982).
51. Id. § 6-120.
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need of supervision" (CINS).5 2 A CINS is a child who is truant, diso-
bedient, and ungovernable, or who has committed an offense applica-
ble only to children.13 A delinquent is a child who has committed an
act that would be a crime if committed by an adult.
54
2. Mental Hygiene Administration-The services that the Mental
Hygiene Administration (MHA) provides for children include funding
and operating psychiatric hospitals, residential treatment centers for
adolescents, and community mental health centers and outpatient clin-
ics.55 The juvenile court may commit a child involuntarily to an MHA
psychiatric facility56 if it adjudges the child a CINA, CINS, or delin-
quent and determines that: (1) the child has a mental disorder; (2) the
child needs inpatient medical care or treatment for the protection of
himself or others; (3) the child is unable to be voluntarily admitted; and
(4) no less restrictive treatment alternatives are available.57 When the
child is ready to be discharged from an MHA hospital or residential
program, MHA has limited after-care planning responsibilities that do
not extend to purchasing foster care placement or group home place-
ment.58 Although MHA is supposed to serve children properly com-
mitted to MHA facilities by the juvenile court, if MHA has no room for
such a child, it does not fund a private residential placement, for it has
no authority to purchase care from private facilities.59
3. Mental Retardation/Developmental Disabilities Administra-
tion-Like MHA, the Mental Retardation/Developmental Disabilities
Administration (MR/DDA) provides very limited options to handi-
capped children needing residential placements.6" Although it is re-
52. Id. at § 6-109; MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-820(b)(1) (1980 & Supp.
1982); See infra text accompanying note 122.
53. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(f) (1980 & Supp. 1982).
54. Id. at § 3-801(k).
55. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -1101 (1982) (Maryland Mental Hy-
giene Law).
56. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-820(b), (f) (1980 & Supp. 1982).
57. Id. at § 3-820(f). Children may also be involuntarily admitted to an MHA psychiat-
ric facility if the child: has a mental disorder, presents a danger to the life or safety of
himself or others, is unable to be voluntarily admitted, and there is no less restrictive form of
intervention available. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-617 (1980 & Supp. 1982).
58. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-809 (1982).
59. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Prince George's Co., 47 Md. App.
436, 447 n.10, 423 A.2d 589, 595 n.10 (1980).
60. Although the Mental Retardation Administration has some purchase-of-care funds,
its primary service is placement of children in state residential institutions. As of August,
1982, there were 499 persons under age 21 in state MR/DDA residential centers. By
MR/DDA's own assessment, 34% or 170 of these children do not require institutional levels
of care. During this same period, MR/DDA funded six children in alternative living units
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quired to place children who are mentally retarded and in need of
twenty-four hour care,61 its only responsibility to a mentally retarded
child who does not need such care is to "recommend" an appropriate
program for that child.62
The juvenile court may commit a child to a MR/DDA residential
facility after adjudging him a CINA, CINS, or delinquent if it also
determines that: the child is mentally retarded, the child needs in-resi-
dence care or treatment for the adequate care or protection of himself
or others, and there is no less restrictive form of care and treatment
available.63
III. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM MARYLAND'S FRAGMENTED
SERVICE DELIVERY SYSTEM
As Lisa's story illustrates, Maryland's system of delivering services
to handicapped children is riddled with problems including inappropri-
ate or inadequate services, delays in service delivery, and sometimes, a
denial of all services. These problems are caused by: (1) the failure to
mandate services other than those provided by the Department of Edu-
cation; (2) vague statutory provisions; (3) conflicting statutory and reg-
ulatory provisions; (4) the lack of coordination between agencies
serving these youngsters; and (5) the lack of accountability.
A. The Failure to Mandate Services
The most glaring defect in Maryland's statutory scheme is the fail-
ure to require the agencies that serve children to fulfill the promise of
treatment implicit in both the purpose clause and the disposition sec-
tion of the Juvenile Causes Act. The Act's disposition section requires
that children adjudicated delinquent, in need of assistance, or in need
of supervision receive treatment. It says "the priorities in making a
disposition are the public safety and a program of treatment, training,
and rehabilitation best suited to the physical, mental, and moral wel-
(small group residents). T. ROSE, THE NEED FOR LONG-TERM CARE OPPORTUNITIES FOR
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED CHILDREN IN MARYLAND 4 (1982).
61. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 7-504(a)(2) (1982).
62. Id. at § 7-504(a)(3).
63. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-820(g) (1980 & Supp. 1982). A child also
may be admitted to a state residential center or a private facility upon the application of a
guardian or anyone else "having a legitimate interest in the welfare of a person" if, after a
comprehensive examination, it is determined that: the person is mentally retarded; for pro-
tection or adequate care, the child needs rehabilitation services; and there is no less restric-
tive care and treatment available that is consistent with the person's welfare and safety. MD.
HEALTH-GEN CODE ANN. §§ 7-501, -504(a)(2) (1982).
[VOL. 42
MARYLAND'S EXCHANGEABLE CHILDREN
fare of the child consistent with the public interest."6 4 The Act's pur-
pose clause indicates that Maryland's juveniles should receive
treatment in the least restrictive environment appropriate to their
needs. Among the Act's purposes, it lists:
(3) To conserve and strengthen the child's family ties and to sep-
arate a child from his parents only when necessary for his welfare
or in the interest of public safety;
(4) If necessary to remove a child from his home, to secure for
him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent
to that which should have been given by his parents.65
Relying on this language, the Court of Special Appeals suggested that
juveniles in Maryland have a statutory right to treatment in a home-
like environment.66
More fundamentally, the authority under which the state intrudes
into the family and assumes custody of the child imposes an affirmative
obligation on the state to provide adequate care. The basis for that
authority is the doctrine of parens patriae;67 i.e., the state assumes the
role of parent when it determines that the actual parents are unable to
care for the child. If the state proceeds to provide inadequate care it-
self, it then has subverted the very basis for its action.68 Maryland
rarely fulfills this responsibility because the state never has made the
budgetary commitment to ensure that these children will receive appro-
64. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-820(b) (1980 & Supp. 1982).
65. Id. at § 3-802(a)(3), (4).
66. Maryland courts have relied on these sections of the Juvenile Causes Act in describ-
ing the types of care and treatment to which juveniles in Maryland are entitled. Chief Judge
Murphy (later Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals) explained:
[Tihe Juvenile Act does not contemplate the punishment of children where they are
found to be delinquent, but rather an attempt to correct and rehabilitate them in "a
wholesome family environment whenever possible," although rehabilitation may have
to be sought in some instances in an institution.
In re Hamill, 10 Md. App. 586, 591, 271 A.2d 762, 765 (1970) (citation omitted).
In In re Carter, the Court of Special Appeals addressed the type of care to be given
children adjudicated in need of supervision, another category of children under juvenile
court jurisdiction:
[H]is [child in need of supervision] correction and rehabilitation are designed to take
place in an environment-of the group home, the foster home or like unit-which
duplicates as nearly as possible the intimacy, closeness and wholesomeness of the natu-
ral family environment.
In re Carter, 20 Md. App. 633, 653, 318 A.2d 269, 281 (1973).
67. Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106, 111 (1967); Recent Decision, Wentzel v. Montgomery
General Hospital-Maryland's Equitable Jurisdiction Over Sterlization Petitions. A Constitu-
tionalAnalysis, 42 MD. L. REV. 549, 549 n.4 (1983).
68. See Fagan v. Superintendent of Montrose School, Petition No. 165311, at 4 (Balti-
more City Cir. Ct., Div. for Juv. Causes Nov. 13, 1974).
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priate services once the state becomes their "parent."69
The system's funding structure in effect inhibits provision of serv-
ices. Only the Department of Education is legally mandated to serve
eligible handicapped children in a continuum of placements without
regard to cost.7 ° The services of other agencies are contingent on their
budgets.7' By tying services for handicapped children to agency budg-
ets, Maryland gives each agency an incentive to deny services or to
claim that a handicapped child is not its responsibility, but that of an-
other agency. This practice makes the purpose section of the Juvenile
Causes Act an empty promise. That section proclaims that the Act's
primary purpose is to "provide for a program of treatment, training,
and rehabilitation consistent with the child's best interests and the pro-
tection of the public interest."72
Lisa's story illustrates how illusory the commitment to the child's
best interests can be. In her case it appears that the agencies considered
their own budgetary needs, not the best interests of the child. After
Lisa was placed at the Regional Institute for Children and Adolescents
(RICA), a staff psychologist concluded that she needed to be placed in
a structured group home and then moved to a foster home.73 This
never occurred; instead she was moved to Villa Maria,7 another insti-
tution. Later when the juvenile court adjudicated Lisa a delinquent,75
evaluations from the Maryland Children's Center 76 again indicated
that she needed to be placed in a well supervised and structured thera-
peutic group home.77 Instead she went to Montrose, a training school
69. In 1975 the General Assembly passed Maryland House Joint Res. 49, 1975 Md.
Laws 3866, creating a Commission on Juvenile Justice [hereinafter cited as Karwacki
Comm'n] to determine among other things how the juvenile justice system can be made
more responsive to the needs of children. The Commission's final report, issued in 1977,
states:
The Commission is convinced that intervening in the life of a child and his family
should only occur when benefits to them are likely to be realized. Necessary resources
to implement these provisions must be supplied by the appropriation of adequate funds.
The Governor and General Assembly are urged to meet the challenge.
Karwacki Comm'n Report at 27 (1977).
70. Education's budget shall include appropriations necessary to fund the state's contri-
butions to special education programs. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8-417.4(b) (1978).
71. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 32C (1979 & Supp. 1982); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. §§ 6-120(b), 10-902. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 15A, § 14 (1981).
72. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-802(a)(1) (1980).
73. RICA Psychological Evaluation (Apr. 15, 1975).
74. DSS Child's Whereabouts Sheet (Oct. 30, 1975); DSS Notes (Oct. 30, 1975).
75. In re . No. 67826510 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct., Div. for Juv. Causes (1978)).
76. Memo from Master, Baltimore City Cir. Ct., Div. for Juv. Causes (Oct. 20, 1978).
The Maryland Children's Center (MCC) was a DHMH facility that evaluated children.
MCC Psychological Evaluation (Oct. 6, 1978); MCC Psychiatric Evaluation (Oct. 13, 1978).
77. MCC Psychiatric Evaluation (Oct. 13, 1978).
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for delinquents. Two years later, she finally received a more appropri-
ate placement in Hannah More, a school for emotionally disturbed
children. But after Hannah More accepted her, she spent six extra
months in Montrose while Social Services and Juvenile Services argued
about who should pay for her treatment.78 Lisa's best interests seemed
to be of secondary importance.
Lisa's story also illustrates how Maryland's system for delivering
services to handicapped children frequently does not operate in the
public interest. Lisa's records indicate that she has undergone about
thirty different evaluations in the last nine years.79 Although these
evaluations yielded different labels and descriptions of Lisa's problems,
nearly all of them prescribed a full-time residential placement, support-
ive adult guidance, and a vocational educational program.8" Each of
these repeated evaluations was conducted at substantial public expense,
and few yielded any new information or recommendations. Moreover,
the recommendations rarely were followed because of the lack of avail-
able services."
Additionally, Maryland's failure to provide Lisa with appropriate
services has been enormously expensive in terms of the cost of contin-
ued residential placements. Had Lisa received appropriate services in a
group home at an early age, her continued institutionalization at public
expense might have been avoided. Lisa is currently in an out-of-state
private facility that charges the state $57,630 a year for Lisa's care.82
Furthermore, ten placements in eight years have left Lisa so damaged
that she may now require permanent institutionalization.
78. Lisa had been committed to the care and custody of Social Services in 1974. Al-
though she had been adjudged delinquent and committed to the care and custody of Juve-
nile Services in November, 1978, Juvenile Services maintained that Social Services was
solely responsible for funding the placement. Letter from Supervisor of Community Pro-
grams Dep't of Juv. Serv. to Dist. Supervisor, DSS (Jan. 23, 1980). In late January, 1980,
Social Services agreed to fund the placement, but Hannah More stated at that time that they
were no longer processing Social Services' cases due to continual funding "foul-ups" with
children that Social Services had referred. Letter from Juvenile Service Regional Supervi-
sor, Juv. Ct. Serv. Div., to Chief of Special Serv. for Children, DSS (Jan. 29, 1980). Lisa's
records do not indicate how this problem was resolved, but while these administrative issues
were being worked out, Lisa spent an additional six to seven months in her "temporary"
placement at Montrose.
79. See file located in office of S. Leviton.
80. Walter P. Carter Center, Psychiatric Updates (Apr. 23, 1981, Mar. 23, 1981). Balti-
more City Dep't of Educ., I.E.P. (Nov. 17, 1980); Hannah More, Discharge Summary (Oct.
4, 1980); Hannah More Pscyhiatric Update (Oct. 2, 1980); Hannah More, I.E.P. Report (July
19, 1980); J.S.A. Psychological Evaluation (Dec. 26, 1979).
81. See supra note 13.
82. Purchase of Care Agreement between Baltimore City DSS and Brown School (July
1, 1983 - June 30, 1984).
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But the cost to the public of the state's mismanagement of Lisa's
needs is not limited to dollars; it includes the loss of a child who was
once considered "bright, intelligent, and attractive looking."83 The
state has not only wasted money; it has wasted Lisa's life.
B. Vague Statutes
Budgetary considerations give agencies an incentive to disclaim re-
sponsibility for mentally handicapped children; vague statutes provide
excuses for not serving these youngsters. Because Maryland's statutes
do not define clearly either the services or the populations for which the
agencies are responsible, each agency can, and often does, argue that
another should serve a particular child. As a result, needed services
often are delayed or denied altogether. They may simply be delayed as
the agencies quarrel about who is responsible for a particular child.
They also may be denied altogether because no agency is required, and
none chooses, to provide a particular service.
1. Failure to Define Agency Populations-Maryland attempts to
define agency populations not by services needed but by the nature of
the clients' problems. This approach makes agency responsibility de-
pendent on the labels attached to children's problems and invites label
manipulation. Mentally handicapped children are particularly vulner-
able to label manipulation because there is no clear taxonomy of neu-
rological, mental, and behavioral disorders.8 4 Accordingly, many
experts call for de-emphasis of labeling with respect to such conditions
and for a new focus on function/dysfunction and treatment and serv-
ices based on need.85 But in Maryland many children remain victims
of labeling.
For example, although Education is responsible for some of these
children, no clear lines distinguish between those who are, and those
who are not, eligible for Education's services. Instead, the Education
Bylaws rely on undefined and easily manipulated labels. 86 For exam-
83. G.B.M.C. Progress Notes (June 3, 1968).
84. Palfrey, Mervis, & Butler, New Directions in the Evaluation and Education of Handi-
capped Children, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 819, 823, 824 (1978).
85. Laurie & Laurie, A Noncategorical Approach to Treatment Programsfor Children and
Youth, 40 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 596, 603-04 (1970).
86. When the child's problem is neurological, mental, or behavioral, pinpointing the
cause of the problem and prescribing treatment is not simple. Most of these conditions are
not "either-or" problems: At what point does a child cease to be mischievous and begin to
have a conduct disorder? When does a child cease to be imaginative and begin to be men-
tally ill? See Reynolds & Balow, Categories and Variables in Special Education, 38 EXCEPT.
CHILD. 357, passim (1972). Additionally, there is considerable overlap among conditions
such as mental retardation, mental illness, behavior disorders, learning disabilities, and
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pie, Education can maintain that a child is not "seriously emotionally
disturbed," but "socially maladjusted." ' The relevant Maryland and
federal laws mandate special educational services for children in the
former category while they refuse them to youngsters in the latter.8 8
By not defining the difference between emotional disturbance and
social maladjustment, these laws make it easy for the Department of
Education to avoid responsibility to emotionally disturbed children. 9
hyperactivity. See generally Adelman, The Not So Specific Learning Disability Population,
37 EXCEPT. CHILD. 528 (1971) (population labeled as learning disabled is heterogenous with
respect to etiology and remedial strategies); Gajar, Characteristics Across Exceptional Cate-
gories: EMR, LD, and ED, 14 J. SPEC. EDUC. 165 (1980) (refinement of identification proce-
dures needed to differentiate among educably mentally retarded, learning disabled, and
emotionally disturbed children).
Because many children do not fit into a "pure type," but instead have multiple
problems, to affix a particular label or diagnosis to a child is often to suggest a uniformity
about the child's make-up that does not exist. Morse, Educational Implications of Differential
Diagnosis, in EDUCATING THE EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED 21, 23 (H. Hersham ed. 1969).
87. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(8) (1982); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 05.01.02A(2)(h)(ii)
(1978).
Another problem with federal and Maryland law's treatment of emotionally dis-
turbed children is that they limit the right to a free appropriate education to those children
whose emotional disturbance is "serious." Before the EAHCA, a significant population of
students with mild to moderate emotional problems received state-funded special education
and related services. Raiser & Van Nagel, The Loophole in P.L. 94-142, 46 EXCEPT. CHILD.
516, 518 (1980). Under EAHCA (and the Maryland Bylaws), these children have no fight to
special education services and thus may remain in the regular classroom without any sup-
port services. Id. This situation may be detrimental not only to the disturbed children but
also to the regular education teachers, who have neither the training nor the time to deal
with these children's needs, and to the disturbed children's normal classmates, whose classes
are disrupted and who receive less teacher attention. Id.
In addition, the term "seriously" limits none of the other handicapping conditions
described in the EAHCA regulations and the Maryland Bylaws. This suggests that although
children with other handicapping conditions are entitled to a wide range of special educa-
tion services and must be educated in the least restrictive appropriate environment, emotion-
ally disturbed children are eligible for only the more restrictive placements and services. Id.
88. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(8) (1982); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A § 05.01.02A(2)(h)(ii)
(1978). Once the schools determine that these children are socially maladjusted there are no
school programs to offer them.
Another group of youngsters requiring services are [sic] the inner city/urban
type youth with social and cultural problems. Their unique problems make it difficult
for these youngsters to utilize public school settings. In many cases, they are accurately
referred to as "disruptive youth." Since they do not technically meet the criteria for
special education and with only a few school systems having specific programs for "dis-
ruptive youth" (e.g., "alternative" schools), these youngsters are often suspended or ex-
pelled from public schools. Their subsequent referral to the juvenile court, and
placement on probation/protective supervision status raises serious question [sic] when
an educational program is not available for the youngster. The resolution in many
cases is to remove the youth from school and assist the youngster to enter the labor
market, where teenagers already represent the greatest percentage of unemployment.
JSA 1980-84 Plan at V-632 (undated).
89. Health professionals generally do not agree on any particular definition of "serious
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Most writers who have attempted to distinguish between these condi-
tions have done so, not on the basis of the problem behavior's nature,
but on the basis of the problem behavior's cause. One has defined the
difference in terms of choice: The emotionally disturbed child has no
control over his or her problem behavior, while the socially malad-
justed child chooses to engage in his or her problem behavior.9" Other
writers have explained the difference in terms of learning and/or envi-
ronment: The emotionally disturbed child's problem behavior is the
result of a disorder of cognition or affect and seems deviant to every-
one, while the socially maladjusted child's behavior is learned and con-
forms to the norms of his or her subgroup but does not conform to
larger societal norms.9' Still other writers have rejected the distinction
altogether, and have argued that the conditions are not truly separable,
that a socially maladjusted child is necessarily an emotionally dis-
turbed child, or in the alternative, that modern psychiatry and psychol-
ogy are not advanced enough to pinpoint the cause of such problem
behavior and so are incapable of distinguishing between emotional dis-
turbance and social maladjustment.92 Current psychiatric and psycho-
logical theory and practice, which de-emphasize the cause of problem
emotional disturbance." In fact, most psychiatrists and psychologists do not use the label
"emotionally disturbed." Instead, they use terms such as "conduct disorder" and "behavior
disorder," which include both "emotional disturbance" and "social maladjustment," or they
simply describe the child's problem behavior without assigning a label. AMERICAN PSYCHI-
ATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 45-
50, 299-302 (3d ed. 1980); Achenbach, Behavior Disorders of Children and Adolescents, in I
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLINICAL ASSESSMENT 113, 113-27, (R. Woody ed. 1980); Behavioral and
Antisocial Disorders, 2 BASIC HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY 482-83 (J. Noshpitz ed.
1979); Raiser & Van Nagel, supra note 87, at 518. Moreover, in the federal and state defini-
tions there are no criteria listed for determining who is a socially maladjusted child.
Accordingly, when the LEA reviews psychiatric and psychological evaluations of
children suspected of having a handicapping condition, the LEA must attempt to determine
whether a diagnosis of conduct or behavior disorder or a description of problem behavior
translates into "serious emotional disturbance" or "social maladjustment." If the LEA is
attempting to minimize special education costs, it may consistently lean toward finding so-
cial maladjustment rather than serious emotional disturbance. "The fact is that there is no
clear, unambiguous definition of emotional disturbance. . . . To enshrine an arbitrary defi-
nition of social deviance by government decree and to make that arbitrary definition the
basis of a bureaucratic mandate for special education is to invite disappointment." Kauf-
man, Where Special Educationfor Disturbed Children is Going- A Personal View, 46 EXCEPT.
CHILD. 522, 524 (1980).
90. Bower, EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF EMOTIONALLY HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN
SCHOOL 16, 21-22 (2d ed. 1974).
91. See generally N. HOBBS, ISSUES IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF CHILDREN passim
(1977).
92. Kaufman, supra note 89, at 524. See also Pulfrey, Mervis, & Butler, supra note 84
(stating that EAHCA assumes a sophistication of diagnostic ability and curriculum design
that does not exist).
[VOL. 42
MARYLAND'S EXCHANGEABLE CHILDREN
behavior in favor of focusing on describing the behavior and the child's
needs, appear to favor these latter views.93 Because we do not under-
stand the causes of problem behavior, the statutory differentiation be-
tween emotionally disturbed and socially maladjusted children
represents the kind of "ambiguity of language and frailty of logic that
keeps lawyers busy and drives decent people insane." 94
Lisa's case history illustrates how an education agency may take
advantage of the social maladjustment loophole to avoid responsibility
for an emotionally disturbed child's educational needs. In May, 1980,
a Baltimore City State Aid Screening Committee reviewed Lisa's
records to determine if Lisa was handicapped under the law. 95 The
reports that the Committee considered did not describe Lisa as socially
maladjusted nor as emotionally disturbed. Instead, these reports de-
scribed Lisa as having "definite signs of organicity as evident by emo-
tional instability, hyper-activity, tangentiality, and verbal-performance
I.Q. discrepancy;" 96 as having violent episodes resulting from her "un-
derlying depressive process; 97 as having "borderline mental retarda-
tion with hyperactivity;"9 as being an "emotionally immature child
with borderline intellectual functioning;" 99 and as being on drug ther-
apy for anxiety and depression."° The Committee determined that
Lisa was socially maladjusted, therefore not handicapped under the
law, and that she should attend a day program for delinquents upon
her release from Montrose.' 0 Yet, a year later in July, 1981, a Balti-
more City State Aid Screening Committee determined that Lisa was
seriously emotionally disturbed, handicapped under the law, and enti-
tled to special education and related services.° 2 This Committee based
its decision on psychological and psychiatric reports used by the May,
1980, Committee and on more recent psychiatric reports that described
Lisa's problems in similar terms. Thus the difference between the May,
1980, and July, 1981, decisions cannot be attributed to any change in
93. See supra note 86.
94. Kaufman, supra note 89, at 524.
95. Baltimore City Dep't of Educ., State Aid Screening Comm., Notice of Proposed
Placement Action (May 8, 1980).
96. JSA Psychiatric Evaluation (Nov. 3, 1978).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. JSA Psychological Evaluation (Dec. 26, 1979).
100. JSA Psychiatric Follow-up (Dec. 20, 1979).
101. Baltimore City Dep't of Educ., State Aid Screening Comm., Notice of Proposed
Placement Action (May 8, 1980). See 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b) (1982); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit.
13A, § 05.01.02A(2)(h)(ii) (1978).
102. Baltimore City Dep't of Educ., State Aid Screening Comm., Notice of Proposed
Placement Action (July 15, 1981).
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Lisa's status or needs. Perhaps it stemmed from the presence of coun-
sel representing Lisa at the second meeting. Although the Baltimore
City Department of Education finally acknowledged its responsibility
to Lisa, the social maladjustment loophole enabled the Department to
deny its responsibility for more than a year.
The Maryland and federal laws that establish eligibility criteria for
special education services also draw a distinction that invites the De-
partment of Education to argue that Juvenile Services or Social Serv-
ices bears the major responsibility for a mentally handicapped child.
The distinction is between children needing residential placements for
educational reasons and children requiring such placements because of
medical, social, emotional, or environmental factors segregable from
educational needs. When the child needs a residential placement to
learn, the education agency is responsible for the full cost of the place-
ment. 10 3 When, however, the education agency can show that a child
needs a residential placement for other reasons, the educational agency
has no responsibility, or only partial responsibility, for the
placement. 104
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B), § 1413(a)(4)(B) (1975); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8-409
(1978 & Supp. 1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1982).
104. Federal and state courts have had difficulty in determining when a child needs a
residential placement for educational reasons and when such a placement is necessary for
non-educational reasons. In one of the first cases to deal with this issue, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined a school board from denying a sixteen-
year-old, multiply handicapped child free placement in a residential academic program be-
cause it found his social, emotional, medical, and educational problems to be so intertwined
that it was not possible for the court to perform the "Solomon-like task" of separating them.
North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979).
When presented with similar facts, several federal and state courts have adopted the
North intertwined-needs test. See, e.g., Erdman v. Connecticut, No. H80-253 (D. Conn.
Aug. 22, 1980), reprinted in 3 EDUCATION FOR THE HANDICAPPED LAW REPORTER [EHLR]
(CRR) 552:218; Manchester Bd. of Educ. v. Connecticut Bd. of Educ., No. 227093 (Sup. Ct.,
Jud. Dist. Hartford/New Britain Apr. 22, 1981), reprinted in 3 EHLR (CRR) 552:397. The
Office of Civil Rights (OCR) has taken a similar approach in several cases. See, e.g.,
OCR/Complaint LOFS (Conn. Dept. of Educ. Oct. 17, 1979), reprinted in 3 EHLR (CRR)
257:57-58.
In the only federal appellate case to address this issue, the Third Circuit found that a
child with cerebral palsy and profound mental retardation could learn only in a residential
placement where his medical, social, and emotional problems were treated, and that the
unseverability of the child's educational, medical, social, and emotional needs was "the very
basis for holding that these services are an essential prerequisite for learning." Kruelle v.
New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 694 (3d Cir. 1981).
In a related line of cases, several courts have framed the issue in terms of whether
the child needs a residential placement to succeed in school; that is, whether the child is able
to learn only in a residential setting where medical, emotional, and social problems are
treated. See, e.g., Capello v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., No. 79-1006 (D.D.C. Jan.
23, 1980), reprinted in 3 EHLR (CRR) 551:500 (child's academic progress in day programs
and residential settings determines whether the child needed a residential setting); Gladys J.
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In Maryland, the issue of whether a handicapped child needs a
residential placement for "educational" reasons or for "non-educa-
tional" reasons often arises in situations involving the "home circum-
stances" provision of the Maryland Education Bylaws."°5 If the child
needs the residential placement for educational reasons, the placement
will be provided at the expense of the Department of Education and at
no cost to the parents."° The Bylaws specially provide for a handi-
capped child who is enrolled in an appropriate local educational pro-
gram, but needs a residential setting because of the conditions of his or
her "home circumstances."'0 7  In this situation, the local education
agency is not responsible for the full cost of the residential placement,
but only for the cost of the child's educational program, up to a maxi-
mum of the cost of the school program the child would have attended if
living at home.' The state or local agency responsible for the child's
care, usually Social Services or Juvenile Services, then pays the remain-
der of the cost of the residential placement.0 9 As one might expect,
this system induces Social Services and Juvenile Services to argue that
a child needs a residential program for educational reasons and the
Department of Education to argue that a child needs the program be-
cause of home problems or social problems.
Again, Lisa's case provides a concrete example of the overlap of a
child's handicapping and home circumstance problems. Lisa's home
circumstances were deplorable. Abandoned by her father, Lisa's
mother was often hospitalized for depression. 1 0 Lisa was placed with
her grandmother while her brothers entered foster care, one of whom
died at the hands of abusive foster parents."' Lisa's mother eventually
remarried-unsuccessfully--to a man who disliked and mistreated
v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., No. G-81-134 (S.D. Tex. Galveston Div. Aug. 17, 1981),
reprinted in 3 EHLR (CRR) 552:480 (same); Matthews v. Campbell, No. 78-0879-R (E.D.
Va. July 16, 1979), reprintedin 3 EHLR (CRR) 551:264 (same); Mahoney v. Administrative
School Dist. No. 1, No. 13417 (Oregon Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1979), reprinted in 3 EHLR (CRR)
551:532; Manchester Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., No. 227093 (Sup. Ct., Jud. Dist. of
Hartford/New Britain Apr. 22, 1981), reprintedin 3 EHLR (CRR) 552:397; Wallingford Bd.
of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., No. 17-84-46 (Sup. Ct., Jud. Dist. of New Haven, Conn. Jan.
6, 1981), reprinted in 3 EHLR (CRR) 552:305 (asking if the child needs a residential place-
ment to achieve his or her maximum potential for self-sufficiency).
105. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 05.01.06F(2)(e) (1979).
106. MD. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 8-409(b) (1978 & Supp. 1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1982);
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 05.01.06F(2)(a) (1979).
107. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 05.01.06F(2)(e) (1979). See supra note 32.
108. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 05.01.06F(2)(e) (1979).
109. Id.
110. DSS Referral of Child for Purchase of Care (Sept. 22, 1978).
111. Id.; Hannah More I.E.P. Conference Report (July 23, 1980).
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Lisa.' 12 In 1974, Lisa's mother committed her to Social Services, where
Lisa was shunted from placement to placement as the various agencies
charged with caring for mentally handicapped children passed respon-
sibility for her back and forth.
Lisa was evaluated and re-evaluated in the many programs and
institutions she passed through between 1974 and 198 1. The evaluators
divided about half and half as to the source of Lisa's problems-handi-
capping condition or home circumstances. For example, the University
of Maryland Learning and Behavior Clinic's pediatrician considered
her "retarded with neurological dysfunction and behavior problems
secondary to her socio-economic situation.""' 3  Although the RICA
psychologist thought her poor verbal scores were a product of her envi-
ronment, 114 one and a half years later her teacher at Villa Maria con-
cluded that even if Lisa's behavior improved, she would still need a
class for the educable mentally retarded." 5 Similarly, the Maryland
Children's Center and Montrose psychiatrists laid the primary blame
for Lisa's problems at different doors--one focused on her disruptive
family life;" 16 the other, on her organic problems." 7
Like Lisa, many children have both a handicapping condition and
a home circumstances problem. Often the two are inextricably inter-
twined. In such situations, it may be difficult or impossible to deter-
mine if the child needs a residential placement because of his or her
handicapping condition or because of his or her "home circum-
stances.""'  The home circumstances provision of the Education By-
laws, however, will provide an excuse for Education to disclaim
responsibility.
Mentally handicapped children who are not eligible for Educa-
tion's services must contend with the juvenile court's labeling system.
It provides other opportunities for agencies, driven by budgetary con-
straints, to evade responsibility for handicapped youngsters. The court
uses the labels child in need of assistance (CINA), child in need of
112. Hannah More I.E.P. Conference Report (July 23, 1980).
113. Letter from University of Maryland School of Health, Physician, Learning & Behav-
ior Problem Clinic, Dep't of Pediatrics to Lisa's DSS Worker (May 2, 1974).
114. RICA Psychological Evaluation (Apr. 15, 1975).
115. Queen of Angels, Educational Evaluation (Oct. 21, 1976).
116. MCC Psychiatric Evaluation (Oct. 13, 1978).
117. See references to the Montrose psychiatrist's report in JSA Psychiatric Evaluation
(Nov. 3, 1978); JSA Psychiatric Follow-ups (Apr. 10, 1980; Mar. 20, 1980; Mar. 6, 1980; Feb.
26, 1980; Jan. 31, 1980; Jan. 17, 1980; Dec. 20, 1979; Sept. 14, 1979; June 4, 1979; Apr. 30,
1979; Mar. 8, 1979).
118. See supra note 104.
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supervision (CINS), and juvenile delinquent." 9 As mentioned above,
by statutory definition, a CINA is a child who is not receiving proper
care or is mentally handicapped and whose parents are unable or un-
willing to care for her; 2 ° a CINS is a child who is truant, disobedient
and ungovernable, a danger to herself or others, or who has committed
an offense applicable only to children;' 2 ' and a delinquent is a child
who has committed an act which would be a crime if committed by an
adult. 22 As a rough division of responsibility, Social Services and Ju-
venile Services have agreed that Juvenile Services will provide services
to children whose social behavior has caused them to come to the atten-
tion of the juvenile court, (CINS and juvenile delinquents) while Social
Services will provide services to children who are dependent or ne-
glected, and in need of a healthy home environment. 23 This distinc-
tion in service provision does not address the delineation of agency
responsibility for the handicapped child whose behavior is socially un-
acceptable and whose home situation is less than satisfactory. 24
Because children who pass through the juvenile court have similar
needs and profiles, they often fit into more than one category. 25 Con-
119. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(e),(f),(k) (1980 & Supp. 1982). For full
definitions of these terms, see infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
120. MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(e) (1980 & Supp. 1982).
121. Id. at § 3-801(f).
122. Id. at § 3-801(k), (1).
123. This division of responsibility is essentially based on labels. Social Services takes
responsibility for CINA and Juvenile Services takes responsibility for CINS and juvenile
delinquents. Memo from Ruth Massinga to Members, State Coordinating Comm. on Hand-
icapped Children at 3 (Mar. 23, 1981). Juvenile Services has stopped filing CINS petitions
in situations where a CINA petition may be appropriate. JSA Planning Policy for CINS at
1, 4 (Feb. 1980).
124. This is the profile of the classic "multiple-problem" child. Memo from Ruth Mas-
singa to Members, State Coordinating Comm. on Handicapped Children at 3 (Mar. 23,
1981).
125. Many children incarcerated as juvenile delinquents have handicapping conditions.
Morgan, Prevalence and Types of Handicapping Conditions Found in Juvenile Correctional
Institutions: .A National Survey, 13 J. SPEC. EDUC. 283, 285, 291-92 (1979). Juvenile correc-
tional administrators report that over 42% of the incarcerated delinquent population have
handicapping conditions. The most common handicapping conditions in this population are
emotional disturbance (16%), specific learning disability (10%), and mental retardation
(10%). Other studies indicate that the incidence of specific learning disabilities in this popu-
lation ranges as high as 80%. Id. at 291-92.
Much of this population has serious mental health problems. Bower, supra note 90,
at 38; Chiles, Miller & Cox, Depression in an Adolescent Delinquent Population, 37 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1179, 1180-84 (1980) (finding that 23% of the delinquent population has a
major affective disorder); Morgan, supra note 125, at 285 (juvenile correction administrators
report that over 16% of the incarcerated delinquent population is emotionally disturbed).
Some writers have said that a delinquent act is, in fact, a symptom of a mental
health problem, that there is no meaningful difference in the psychiatric profiles of children
labeled as delinquents and those labeled as disturbed, and that therefore it is absurd to place
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sequently, the court's perception of a particular child and thus the serv-
ices it orders for him or her may depend solely upon which agency
presents the case to the court. 126 Because similar problems can result in
children being brought to the attention of different agencies, which
agency presents a particular case often may be a function of chance. 127
Furthermore, because many children fit into more than one category, a
state agency easily can manipulate these labels to shift responsibility to
some other agency,12 which in turn manipulates labels to shift respon-
children labeled "delinquents" in penal institutions and those labeled "disturbed" in hospi-
tal situations. Lewis, Shank, Cohen, Kligfeld, & Frisone, Race Bias in the Diagnosis and
Disposition of Violent Adolescents, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1211, 1215-16 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Lewis]. Lewis, supra, reported that hospitalized adolescents are as violent as incar-
cerated adolescents, that these groups are psychiatrically similar, and, ironically, that the
incarcerated adolescents are significantly more likely to have sustained a head injury requir-
ing psychiatric care than are hospitalized adolescents; that aggressive behavior in an adoles-
cent boy is likely to be considered the deliberate act of a healthy youngster and to result in
his incarceration, yet similar behavior in a girl is considered psychologically aberrant and
more often results in hospitalization; and that violent, disturbed black adolescents tend to be
incarcerated whereas violent, disturbed white adolescents tend to be hospitalized. This
problem is essentially the same as the emotional disturbance-social maladjustment problem
in the educational labeling system.
Studies have also shown strong correlation between a child's experiencing or wit-
nessing abuse and subsequent delinquent behavior. See, e.g., Lewis, Shanock, Pincus, &
Glaser, Violent Juvenile Delinquent in J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 307, 315-16 (1979)
(suggesting that some children adjudged delinquent are abused or neglected children and
therefore could be adjudged CINA's and committed to Social Services for placement in a
foster home or group facility rather than incarcerated).
Other studies have shown that abused and neglected children usually have serious
mental health problems. These findings suggest that many children adjudged as CINA and
placed in foster or group home care might need mental health services or placement in a
mental health facility. Kinard, Emotional Development in Physically Abused Children, 50
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 686, 693-95 (1980); Kinard, Mental Health Needs ofAbused Chil-
dren, 50 CHILD WELFARE 451, 460-61 (1980).
126. The procedures for filing a juvenile court petition are described in MD. CTS & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-810 to -820 (1980 & Supp. 1982).
127. Education also may be the first agency to become aware of the child's problems. See
infra text accompanying notes 158-68.
128. Many children who run away from home or are ungovernable (CINS) have family
problems and thus could be labeled as CINA. JSA states:
Another problem facing JSA relates to the type of juvenile this Administration
is beginning to receive. Current experience indicates that Juvenile Services is getting
more disturbed youth referred for community based placement than in the past. Be-
cause these youngsters are aggressive and assaultive, cannot function in a public school
setting, and run away, they are more difficult to maintain in the community and require
treatment services beyond the scope of many of the facilities within the State of Mary-
land. These youngsters could more appropriately be labeled as children in need of
assistance (CINA), but because of the scarcity of resources and their technical involve-
ment with delinquent type behavior, they are being adjudicated to be CINS or delin-
quent. The problem is that there is no single agency that is capable of providing the
services that this group ofyoungsters need [sic].
JSA 1980-84 Plan at V-638 (undated) (emphasis in original).
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sibility to still some other agency, and so on. 129
Lisa's case is illustrative. In 1974, the juvenile court adjudged Lisa
"dependent" ("dependent" was the 1974 equivalent of CINA) and
committed her to Social Services' custody.' 30 During the next several
years, Lisa evidenced serious mental health problems, but received lit-
tle treatment for these problems.' 3 ' Later, Lisa had violent episodes
and at one point destroyed someone else's property. Because the de-
struction would have been criminal had she been an adult, Lisa then fit
the definition of a delinquent. Social Services, in fact, requested that
the juvenile court adjudicate her delinquent, which the court did before
committing her to Juvenile Services' custody. 132 But Lisa also was ne-
glected, mentally ill, and possibly mentally retarded, and so she quali-
fied as a CINA. 3 3  According to experts' recommendations, Lisa
needed a therapeutic residential placement; Social Services could and
should have asked the court to authorize such a placement and then
should have funded Lisa with excess-cost money. 3 4 By instead re-
questing the court to find Lisa delinquent, Social Services shifted re-
sponsibility for her to Juvenile Services. Thus Social Services'
motivation appears to have been not Lisa's treatment needs and the
"best interests of the child," but the best interests of the agency.
Because Lisa could have been considered ungovernable, she also
fit the definition of a CINS. 35 Had Lisa been labeled a CINS, Juvenile
Services would have been responsible for funding Lisa's placement at
Edgemeade, the private residential facility recommended by the Juve-
nile Court. 36  Because Lisa was labeled a delinquent and Juvenile
129. See infra text accompanying note 144 for a discussion of Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene v. Prince George's Co., 47 Md. App. 436, 423 A.2d 589 (1980), in which
Mental Hygiene, Social Services, and Education each disclaimed responsibility for the cost
of a handicapped child's residential placement.
130. DSS Child Whereabouts Sheet, citing Cir. Ct. Div. for Juv. Causes, Docket No.
002589 (May 15, 1974); supra note 10.
131. For example, after Lisa was in foster care for a month, her foster parent decided that
she no longer could handle Lisa because of Lisa's emotional and behavioral problems. DSS
Notes (April 16, 1975). Social Services does not provide needed supportive services either to
the child or to the foster parent. Nor does it ensure that the foster parent is trained to deal
with the child's emotional problems. Finally, there is no cooperative agreement between
MHA and DSS to supply psychological services to children in the care of Social Services
even though MHA has acknowledged that this is necessary. See infra note 181.
132. In Re..., No. 67826510 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct., Div. for Juv. Causes (1978)).
133. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(e) (1980 & Supp. 1982).
134. See supra text accompanying note 41.
135. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(f) (1980 & Supp. 1982).
136. The Master recommended committing Lisa to JSA for placement at Montrose pend-
ing permanent placement at Edgemeade or a suitable therapeutic long-term facility. In Re
I No. 67826510 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct., Div. for Juv. Causes (1978)).
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Services maintained that only CINS should be placed at Edgemeade, 37
the agency was able to avoid the cost of a private placement and to
"dump" Lisa in a state training school for nearly two years. 38 Had
Juvenile Services chosen to do so, it could have asked the juvenile court
to change Lisa's label from delinquent to CINS, and then funded Lisa's
placement at Edgemeade.'39 Juvenile Services chose instead to main-
tain Lisa in a state facility for juvenile delinquents, a placement that
was glaringly inappropriate and that proved detrimental to Lisa's phys-
ical and mental health.'I
Additionally, the labeling system is not all inclusive and therefore
allows the agencies to completely avoid responsibility for certain chil-
dren. The most vulnerable of all mentally handicapped children are
CINAs who do not qualify as CINS or delinquents but need long term
care. Although Social Services used to accept responsibility for these
youngsters, it recently decided to provide only short term foster or
group care. 14 ' Thus, these children truly are Maryland's stepchil-
dren. 42 No statute mandates services for them and no agency ac-
knowledges an obligation to them. 143
137. See supra note 17. This refusal to place Lisa at Edgemeade was ironic because Lisa
fit into the definition of a CINA or CINS as well or better than she fit into the definition of a
delinquent.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-823(b) (1980 & Supp. 1982) states that a
child who is not a delinquent may not be committed or transferred to a facility used for the
confinement of delinquent children. This statute, however, cannot be interpreted to prevent
children adjudicated delinquent from being placed in a therapeutic facility like Edgemeade.
Rather, the statute requires that a CINS not be placed in a detention center. Edgemeade is
not a detention center. This misinterpretation of the law by Juvenile Services staff kept Lisa
in a training school for nearly two years.
138. Letter from Montrose Superintendent and Social Worker to Regional Supervisor
Dep't of Juv. Serv. (May 24, 1979); Internal Memo from Dep't of Juv. Serv. Counselor (Nov.
19, 1979).
139. MD. R.P. 916(a).
140. See supra note 19.
141. During its 1982 session, the Maryland General Assembly amended Article 88A § 61.
Act of May 20, 1982, ch. 293, 1982 Md. Laws 2612. The purpose of the amendment was to
change Maryland's foster care system from one in which children remained in foster care on
a long-term basis to a system in which foster care becomes a temporary situation with the
goal of reuniting the family. Because handicapped children whose parents are unable or
unwilling to provide care for them are children who usually will require long-term care,
Social Services does not see them as appropriate for foster care services. Speech of Joy
Duva, Director, Child Welfare Dep't, Maryland State Dep't of Human Resources, to the
meeting of the State Office to Coordinate Serv. to the Handicapped (Mar. 31, 1983).
142. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A § 61(b)(3) (1979 & Supp. 1982) provides that in excep-
tional situations as defined by regulation, foster care may be long-term and thus appropriate
for some handicapped children needing this service. The Department of Human Resources,
however, has never issued regulations to define what constitutes an "exceptional situation."
143. The Mental Hygiene Administration believes that Juvenile Services and Social Serv-
ices are responsible for providing and arranging group care for these children and that
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The case of Linda G.44 provides an example of how the agencies
avoid responsibility for these children. Linda was a teen-aged child
with serious emotional problems. 45 After her parents were unsuccess-
ful in obtaining help from the local education agency, they placed
Linda at Taylor Manor, a private residential facility. 146 When Linda's
parents were no longer able to pay for her care at Taylor Manor, their
attorney filed a CINA petition147 seeking funding from the state.
At the subsequent hearings, the agencies scrambled to avoid re-
sponsibility for Linda. The attorney for the Prince Georges County
Department of Social Services stated that although she believed that
Linda was a child in need of assistance, she did not believe that the
LDSS was the proper agency to serve as custodian because Linda did
not need any service that it could provide. Instead, she argued, the
Department of Mental Health and Hygiene (DHMH) should be re-
sponsible for all children who are mentally handicapped, including
Linda. 48 On the other hand, the Board of Education argued that the
juvenile court does not have authority to join the Board of Education
as a party to juvenile court proceedings and that federal and state stat-
utes do not permit a local education agency to become a custodian of
children. 49 DHMH maintained that, although the court had authority
MHA should not be developing alternative housing for mentally ill juveniles. See Plaintiffs'
Post-Trial Memorandum at 40, Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979).
On the other hand, Juvenile Services and Social Services believe that these children
should be the responsibility of the Mental Retardation Administration and the Mental Hy-
giene Administration. See excerpt from JSA 1980-84 Plan infra note 155.
Because the Mental Retardation Administration has only six community placements
for minors and limited purchase-of-care funds, and Mental Hygiene has no purchase-of-care
funds and no group homes for minors, children's advocates are loath to ask for commitment
to MRA or MHA for these children.
144. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Prince George's Co., 47 Md. App.
436, 423 A.2d 589 (1980).
145. Linda G. was an adopted child who spent the first six years of her life with a neglect-
ing, alcoholic parent. At eight, she was placed with and adopted by her present parents.
Brief of Appellees at 6-7, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Prince George's Co.,
47 Md. App. 436, 423 A.2d 589 (1980). At the time of the hearing, Linda was at Taylor
Manor because she was extremely self-destructive. Brief of Appellant at E-147, Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Prince George's Co., 47 Md. App. 436, 423 A.2d 589
(1980).
146. Brief of Appellant at 42, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Prince
George's Co., 47 Md. App. 436, 423 A.2d 589 (1980).
147. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Prince George's Co., 47 Md. App. at
439, 423 A.2d at 590. Before April, 1981, parents commonly would file a CINA petition
placing their child in Social Services' custody as a means of obtaining state funding for their
child's placement in a private residential facility. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
148. Brief of Appellant at E-145, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Prince
George's Co., 47 Md. App. 436, 423 A.2d 589 (1980).
149. Id. at E-180-89.
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under the Juvenile Causes Act to order the child committed to DHMH,
it did not have the authority to order that she be placed in a specific
facility. 5
0
The court eventually adjudged Linda a CINA and ordered
DHMH to pay for her treatment in a private residential facility. But on
appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that the juvenile court had
no authority to order the mental hygiene administration to fund a pri-
vate residential placement.' 5'
As Linda G. illustrates, the juvenile court often becomes a market-
place where various agencies squabble to prevent the court from hold-
ing them responsible. The child, meanwhile, is mislabeled, relabeled,
or left with no services while the various agencies state policy reasons
why they should not be responsible. Thus, the Maryland system often
is not a service delivery system at all, but a forum which enables agen-
cies to avoid responsibility for handicapped children in need of
services.
2. The Failure to Define Agency Services-Just as Maryland's
failure to define agency responsibility for various populations of handi-
capped children has created problems, so has its failure clearly to delin-
eate the services each agency should provide. Because the agencies'
statutes are overly broad-allowing, but not requiring the agencies to
provide almost all services--the agencies have been free to decide what
services they will offer and to define their responsibilities in terms of
those services. As a result, the agencies have not offered a continuum
of services for mentally handicapped youngsters; instead there are large
gaps in the services available. 5 2 One of the most noticable is the lack
150. Id. at E-171.
151. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Prince George's Co., 47 Md. App. at
452, 423 A.2d at 597.
152. For the disturbed adolescent in Maryland there are almost no alternatives to institu-
tionalization. See Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum at 25-40, Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F.
Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979). See also the Karwacki Comm'n Report:
The practice of out-of-state placement has reached such proportions due to lack
of resources in Maryland. . . . The needs of both physically and emotionally handi-
capped children are not being adequately met by facilities in Maryland....
RESOLVED; THAT THE MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, THE
MENTAL RETARDATION ADMINISTRATION, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN RESOURCES, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, AND THE JU-
VENILE SERVICES ADMINISTRATION COORDINATE EFFORTS TO PRO-
VIDE IN-STATE SERVICES TO CHILDREN; AND THAT IT IS NOT
DESIRABLE TO PLACE CHILDREN IN OUT-OF-STATE CARE.
Karwacki Comm'n Report, supra note 69, at 45-46.
Some examples from North Carolina of the components that should be present to
provide a continuum of child and adolescent mental health services are case management
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of group homes for mentally handicapped youngsters. Although such
children may need group homes, no one offers these placements to
them. 15 3
For example, although the Mental Hygiene Administration is au-
thorized to provide group homes, it has decided to use its money for
other purposes.' 54 In fact, the Mental Hygiene Administration has no
purchase-of-care funds and thus, if a child needing residential place-
ment is committed to the custody of the Mental Hygiene Administra-
tion, the services available to this child are extremely limited.
Consequently, children with mental problems have been committed to
either Social Services or the Juvenile Services Administration which
placed them in foster or group homes without sufficient therapeutic
services or in institutions for delinquents.'55 Nor under the present sys-
services, respite care, crisis stabilization/residential specialized foster care, supervised in-
dependent living for older children, residential group living (moderate to extensive supervi-
sion), transitional group living, summer programs for school children, family support,
services, and advocacy services. J. KNITZER, UNCLAIMED CHILDREN - THE FAILURE OF
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY TO CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN NEED OF MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES 140-43 (1982).
153. See supra note 143. Although MHA states that it is concerned with the development
of services to children and adolescents, in its 1980-84 plan it proposes to fund only five
group homes for minors by fiscal year 1985. Moreover, this goal is tenth on its list of priori-
ties and to date no group homes have been developed. MHA Summary of the 1980/1984
Plan at 5, 24 (May 10, 1978). In fact since 1979, instead of providing group homes, Mental
Hygiene has built expensive residential treatment centers (e.g. RICA I1; RICA I - additional
beds; Cheltenhan (RICA III)). LAFFERTY, A RESEARCH SURVEY, MARYLAND ASSOCIATION
OF RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES FOR YOUTH 7,8 (Feb. 3, 1983 & amends. Apr. 12, 1983).
The Department of Health & Mental Hygiene requested $200,000 for the purchase
of care in group homes for 15-20 youths in fiscal year 1984. DEP'T HEALTH & MENTAL
HYGIENE, FY 1984 PLANNED PRIORITIES 9 (Sept. 28, 1982). This request, however, was
32nd on its list of priorities. In the past three fiscal years, the Health Department has been
granted, at most, only its top 5 priorities. Thus, there was no chance that this request would
be funded. Telephone conversation with Richard Bandelin (Aug. 26, 1983).
As of August, 1982, there were 499 persons under age 21 in state MR/DDA residen-
tial centers. By MR/DDA's own assessment, 34% or 170 of these children do not require
institutional levels of care. During this same period, MR/DDA funded 6 children in alter-
native living units (small group residence). T. ROSE, supra note 60, at 4.
154. In fiscal year 1982, the Mental Hygiene Administration spent $125,423,107. Eighty-
six point two percent (86.2%) or $108,171,821 of this money was spent on institutional care
while one point one percent (1.1%) or $1,430,290 was spent on community residential and
day programs. For children under age 18, $0 was spent on community residential programs.
Letter from J. Bowen, Administrative Officer, Mental Hygiene Admin. to L. Weinberg (July
1, 1983). Telephone conversation between L. Weinberg and J. Bowen (July 13, 1983).
155. Juvenile Services states:
The institutional facilities at any one time house certain youth with special
needs for intensive specialized services. These youth are most often youngsters with
multi social, educational and psychological problems and are often referred to as emo-
tionally disturbed, borderline retarded, socially maladjusted, etc. These children enter
the Juvenile Services system because of a delinquent offense whose commission is often
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tem is there any incentive for the Mental Hygiene Administration to
develop therapeutic group homes. Agency personnel know that if they
do not have the services the children need, the children will then be-
come the responsibility of another agency.
In addition to not having group homes for mentally handicapped
children, Maryland also lacks the home services that would enable chil-
dren to be maintained in their own home or in home-like environ-
ments. Social Services has no comprehensive program of specialized
foster care that would pay particularly qualified or specifically trained
foster parents to provide care and supervision to emotionally disturbed
juveniles. Similarly, Maryland does not offer sufficient community
support services to allow the child to remain in his own home; daycare
from three to seven p.m.; respite care that would help prevent family
crisis; programs similar to community detention where the child would
remain home under intensive supervision; community-based facilities
such as structured programs for the non-delinquent who requires close
monitoring; and halfway houses, both to prevent hospitalization and to
provide a transition for children being released from the hospital. 56
inseparable from other underlying problems. Frequently, they enter the institutional
programs where they remain for extended periods of time because of difficulty in secur-
ing appropriate community placements.
It is estimated that between five and twenty percent of the population falls
within the category of needing services which could be provided better by the Mental
Health Administration or the Mental Retardation Administration. Yet, sufficient spe-
cialized clinical resources and programs are not available to meet the treatment needs
of this type of youngster.
JSA 1980-84 Plan at V-650 (undated). See also the Karwacki Comm'n Report, supra note
69, which states:
Mental Health. Aftercare
The Mental Health Administration lacks aftercare services to provide support
when a child returns to the community following residential treatment. Lack of
development of community programs and purchase of care often results in the Ju-
venile Services Administration carrying out the responsibility for aftercare services.
RESOLVED: THAT FUNDS ARE NEEDED TO DEVELOP AFTERCARE
PROGRAMS FOR CHILDREN RETURNING TO THE COMMUNITY FOL-
LOWING RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT AND THAT THESE FUNDS BE
APPROPRIATED TO THE MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION.
156. See supra note 152. The present rate structure of Social Services and Juvenile Serv-
ices does not encourage the development of group homes or a continuum of alternative
services for handicapped youngsters. The maximum rate of payment available to group
homes and child care institutions is not sufficient to pay for the individual cost of care and
treatment of emotionally disturbed juveniles. A system of paying for the actual cost of care
would encourage development of these programs. See Plaintiffs Post Trial Memorandum
at 38, Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979). See also JSA 1980/84 Plan at
V-637 (undated) (stating that one obstacle to providing group homes is inadequate reim-
bursement for services).
Juvenile Services purchases some psychological and other supportive services for
youngsters in their homes. Although they acknowledge the value of purchasing these serv-
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Although theorists generally agree that government agencies can
function most effectively when they receive broad grants of power
along with the authority to fill in the details through administrative
regulations informed by agency expertise, that model obviously has
broken down in Maryland. The agencies have failed to fill in impor-
tant "details"-notably a comprehensive program for mentally handi-
capped children. The need for legislative intervention is thus apparent.
Society simply cannot afford to allow gaps in services to persist.
They lead inexorably to penal and mental health institutions filled with
people whose needs might have been answered by less instrusive and
ultimately less expensive services had they been offered earlier. 157 The
cost in wasted financial and human resources is too high.
3. Discrimination Against Children from Needy Families-Finally,
an unfortunate consequence of this system is that its defects dispropor-
tionately affect the poor. Maryland's failure to define clearly the vari-
ous agencies' responsibilities to mentally handicapped children has
caused the nature and quality of services a child receives to be deter-
mined, not by the child's needs, but by which agency serves her.
Which agency serves a child often is determined, in turn, not by the
ability of a particular agency to meet a child's needs, but by which
agency first becomes aware of the child.'58 If the state's first awareness
of the child's problems stems from difficulties in school, the child prob-
ably will be served by the Department of Education; if the state's first
awareness of the child's problems stems from parental abuse, neglect,
or inability to care for the child, the child probably will be served by
Social Services; and, if the state's first awareness of the child's problems
stems from a delinquent or pre-delinquent act, the child probably will
be served by Juvenile Services.159
Which agency first becomes aware of a child is often a function of
the child's family situation, including his or her financial status. Be-
cause the Department of Education implements the very complicated
ices for youths placed in foster care, they are limited in the number of children for whom
they can provide this service because of fiscal restrictions. Interview with Rex Smith, Direc-
tor, JSA (June 28, 1983).
The Department of Human Resources does not provide sufficient support services to
maintain children in their homes. For example, respite care is limited to 7 days plus 24
hours per family per year while in-home aid care is limited to those who are "on brink of
institutionalization or in life threatening circumstances." T. ROSE, supra note 60, at 3.
157. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON FUNDING THE EDUC. OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN,
PHASE II, REPORT, 13 (1977) (the Schifter Comm'n Report).
158. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
159. Id. Of course, many handicapped children have problems in school, at home, and in
society.
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federal and state special education laws and procedures, obtaining a
private residential placement through the Department of Education re-
quires a legally sophisticated parent or a lawyer. 160  Moreover, ob-
taining a special education placement may take as long as six months
or more,' 6' and the only emergency procedures set out in the Education
Bylaws do not substantially shorten the process. 162 For poor families
who have no insurance and have children in crisis, the only way of
getting immediate services for their children is through the Juvenile
Court. 16 3 Consequently, the Department of Education tends to serve
handicapped children from intact middle-class families while juvenile
services and social services, pursuant to court orders, serve poor chil-
dren and those who do not have legally sophisticated parents.' 64 The
upshot of this situation is that middle-class children generally receive
the superior services provided by the better-funded Department of Ed-
ucation, while poor children generally are served by the agencies with
fewer funds. 165
160. The regulations governing special education placements may be found at MD. AD-
MIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 05.01 (1978).
161. The timelines set out in the bylaws are as follows: The LEA must provide a compre-
hensive screening within 30 days of the parent's or guardian's request, MD. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 13A, § 05.01.05B(3) (1978); provide an assessment within 45 days of referral, id. at
§ 05.01.05B(5); receive referrals within 30 days of the assessment. id. at § 05.01.06C(3)(a)(i);
designate the individuals responsible for developing the IEP, within 30 days, id. at
§ 05.01.06C(3)(b)(iii); and implement the IEP within 30 days of development, id. at
§ 05.01.06D(3).
In Lisa's case, although Baltimore City was aware of her since at least December,
1980, it did not complete the screening process until July, 1981. See infra note 178.
162. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 05.01.07A(10) (1978).
163. The juvenile court can provide an immediate hearing and place the child on the
same day. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-815 (1980 & Supp. 1982).
164. In 1982, Montgomery County and the State Department of Education funded 117
children in residential placements at a cost of $2,315,786. while Baltimore City in conjunc-
tion with the State Department of Education funded 22 children in residential placements at
a cost of $431,294. Interview with Howard L. Linaburg, Branch Chief, Federal Projects
Branch, Div. of Special Educ., M.S.D.E. (June 22, 1983). Montgomery County is much
wealthier than Baltimore City. Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 603-
19, 458 A.2d 758, 761-70 (1983).
In contrast, of the 62 excess cost placements funded by Social Services, 49 are from
Baltimore City. See Draft Memo from Secretary of Dep't of Human Resources, Kalman R.
Hettleman to Governor Harry Hughes 3 (undated).
165. The Department of Education in fiscal year 1982 spent $6,941,211 on the most ex-
pensive residential placements. Interview with Howard L. Linaburg, Branch Chief, Federal
Projects Branch, Div. of Special Educ., M.S.D.E. (June 22, 1983). During that same year,
Juvenile Services had only $531,008 to spend on these similar placements while Social Serv-
ices had $2,017,917 (Villa Maria contract $1,293,614; all other excess cost placements
$724,303). Telephone interview with James Casey. Asst. Att. Gen., Juv. Serv. Admin. (June
22, 1983); Dept. of Budget & Fiscal Planning; Bud. Form #DBFP-DA6; Budget Estimates
Fiscal Year 1984 at 43, 162.
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Lisa for example, grew up in a relatively poor one-parent family.
When Lisa's mother felt unable to deal with Lisa's problems any
longer, she volunteered Lisa into Social Services boarding care. 166
When Social Services had difficulty in arranging a placement for Lisa,
they filed a petition to have Lisa adjudged delinquent and committed
to Juvenile Services. 167 It was only in 1981, after Lisa's mother ob-
tained counsel, that the Baltimore City Department of Education ac-
knowledged any responsibility for Lisa's special needs. 68
C. Conflicting Statutory and Regulatory Provisions
Just as legislative intervention will be required to mandate services
and to address problems stemming from statutory vagueness, such in-
tervention also will be necessary to correct conflicts in the statutes pro-
viding for handicapped children. For example, although the Juvenile
Causes Act apparently gives the juvenile court authority to commit a
child to the custody or guardianship of any public agency,169 the Edu-
cation Article states that the exclusive means by which the Department
of Education may place a handicapped child in a non-public educa-
tional program is through the procedures outlined in the education
statute.'70 Can the court order the Department of Education, which
has the most resources for these children, to take responsibility for a
handicapped child, or is the court confined to the other agencies, whose
services all are limited by their appropriations? The statutes do not
answer this question.
An even more troubling conflict exists between the Juvenile
Causes Act on the one hand, and the statutes and regulations outlining
Social Services' and Juvenile Services' authority to provide residential
care on the other. One of the stated purposes of the Maryland Juvenile
Causes Act is: "To conserve and strengthen the child's family ties and
to separate a child from his parents only when necessary for his welfare
or in the interest of public safety."'' Yet Maryland's current system of
delivering services to handicapped children often requires parents to
give up custody to obtain services, primarily because Social Services
and Juvenile Services provide residential programs only for children
who are committed by the court to agency custody. 172 Thus if a parent
166. A wealthier family might have been able to purchase supportive psychological serv-
ices which would have enabled Lisa to stay with her mother.
167. See supra text accompanying note 15.
168. See supra text accompanying note 25.
169. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-820(c)(2) (1980 & Supp. 1982).
170. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8-409(e)(1) (1978 & Supp. 1982).
171. MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-802(a)(3) (1980).
172. Juvenile Services always has maintained a policy of not serving children in residen-
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cannot pay for an appropriate treatment program for the child, and can
afford neither the expense nor the delay of the lengthy process for seek-
ing special education, the only way to obtain state funding for the pro-
gram is to surrender the child as a CINA or CINS. Then the Juvenile
Court can commit the child to Social Services or Juvenile Services,
which may pay for the program. 7 3 If the child needs an excess-cost
placement, the only way to obtain funding is for the parents to surren-
der custody and to have the child committed by court order to the cus-
tody of Social Services or to Juvenile Services. 7 4 This means that
concerned parents who might want and be able to retain custody of
their child must give up custody to obtain services.
The policies of the Department of Education also sometimes work
against the state's goal of keeping families intact. For example, local
Departments of Education currently contribute to the cost of residen-
tial placements under the home circumstances provision or in co-
funded cases only when the child has been committed to some other
state agency. 7 5 Thus, if a child has a home circumstances problem
tial placements unless the children were committed by the court to their agency. Letter to
Susan Leviton from Rex Smith, Director, JSA (Dec. 6, 1982). This is true even though the
Juvenile Services statute provides:
The Administration may:
(I) Designate, as its agent for the purposes of this subtitle, any public or pri-
vate agency or organization in this State; and
(2) Spend funds:
(i) to aid that agent or to buy services from it; or
(ii) if adequate services are not available in this State, to buy services
from any agency or organization outside this State.
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 6-113 (1982).
In the past, Social Services served children pursuant to voluntary agreements with
their parents. Recent changes in the law, however, now provide that voluntary placements
can last only for a period of 6 months. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 61(b)(ii) (1979 & Supp.
1982).
173. The Federal government contributes to the cost of foster care only when such care is
pursuant to court order. AFDC program 45 C.F.R. § 233.110(a) (1982). This federal policy
encourages Social Services to seek court commitment of children.
Requiring commitment to obtain services was ruled to be unconstitutional in Kruse
v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va.), vacated and remanded on appeal 434 U.S. 808
(1977). The court held that the local welfare department's practice of accepting legal cus-
tody of handicapped children and placing them in foster care primarily for the purpose of
receiving funds which would enable those children to receive special education services in
private facilities violated plaintiffs' fundamental right to family integrity. The court further
stated that this kind of practice conditioned the provision of government service-special
education-upon the relinquishment of a constitutional right. See also Joyner v. Dumpson,
533 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
174. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
175. See supra text accompanying note 33. See also Memo from Martha J. Irvin to Hear-
ing Review Board (Nov. 17, 1981). This policy seems to be based on language in the regula-
tion that the Department of Education may approve home circumstances funding upon the
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that necessitates residential placement, the parent must give up custody
of the child to get the Department of Education funds for the educa-
tional component of the child's program. This might make sense if the
home circumstances provision were employed only in abuse and ne-
glect situations, but such is not the case. The home circumstances pro-
vision also is used in cases where the parents prefer to keep the child at
home, but the nature of the child's handicap makes it difficult or im-
possible for the parents to care for the child at home.'7 6 To require
parents in such situations to give up custody of the child to obtain Edu-
cation funding is draconian. It discourages family involvement with
the handicapped child and is directly contrary to the purpose section of
the Juvenile Causes Act.
D. Lack of Co-Ordination
Perhaps the most glaring cause of problems in Maryland's current
system for delivering services to handicapped children is the lack of
inter-agency coordination. Different agencies' policies and procedures
may conflict in such a way as to deprive a child of needed services. For
example, Social Services and the Department of Education maintain
different lists of private residential placements where they will fund
services. Consequently, even if both agencies acknowledge responsibil-
ity, a placement in a facility approved by one but not the other may
preclude a joint funding arrangement. For example, when Social Serv-
ices placed Lisa at the Brown School, which is not on the Department
of Education's list of approved private placements, Education refused
to contribute to the cost of her placement, 17 7 even after it conceded that
Lisa was handicapped under the law and that she needed a private
residential placement in order to learn. Social Services therefore is
paying for the entire cost of the care, treatment, and education of a
child who also needs a residential placement in order to learn. 78 Con-
recommendation of the LEA and "in cooperation with the child's family and the appropri-
ate state or local agency responsible for the child's care." MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A,
§ 05.01.06F(2)(e) (1979) (emphasis added). Education could interpret the bylaws to permit
them to co-fund a residential placement with the child's parents. Moreover, if Education
believes the regulations as they are written prohibit co-funding arrangements with the
child's parents, the agency should amend the regulations to read "in cooperation with the
child's family or the appropriate State or local agency responsible for the child's care."
176. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(e) (1980 & Supp. 1982) defines mentally
handicapped children whose parents are unable or unwilling to care for them as CINA.
177. This refusal to contribute to the cost of Lisa's placement extends to the cost of her
special education and related services. Letter from Asst. State Superintendent, Div. of Spe-
cial Educ., Maryland State Dep't of Educ. to Susan Leviton at the University of Maryland
School of Law (Aug. 14, 1981).
178. Id. The Department of Education objected to not having been involved in the plan-
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sequently, those funds are unavailable for other children, who might
need Social Services funding because they don't qualify for Education's
services.
Lisa's case exemplifies an even more troublesome result of the fail-
ure to co-ordinate agency services. Axiomatically children with multi-
ple needs require services that provide for the whole child. But under
the present system, Maryland provides only compartmentalized serv-
ices, which are ineffective in meeting the needs of children.'79 For ex-
ample, Education does not provide alternative educational programs
for socially maladjusted youths, although programs for these young-
sters would enable Juvenile Services more effectively to program for
CINS and delinquents in the community.' Nor does the Mental Hy-
giene Administration provide sufficient community psychological serv-
ices for children in their homes or in foster care.' Finally, no agency
provides community residential resources for mentally handicapped
children because all agencies assume they are the responsibility of
ning of Lisa's placement at the Brown School, and argued that it need not contribute to the
cost of a placement that was not determined through the procedures set out in the Maryland
Education Bylaws.
DSS placed Lisa without the aid of Education because Education had not yet deter-
mined that Lisa was handicapped under the law and had not acknowledged any responsibil-
ity for her residential placement. Although aware of Lisa since at least December, 1980, by
May, 1981, Baltimore City Department of Education had not completed its own screening
processes. In fact, Baltimore City did not make its determination until July, 198 1. See supra
note 102.
179. The Karwacki Comm'n Report states:
Coordination of Children's Services
1. The responsibility for the provision of services is fragmented along agency,
institution or levels of government lines across the State and within regions, result-
ing in service overlaps and gaps.
2. Agencies and government administrations maintain individual administrative
policies and procedures which results in the lack of comprehensive planning for
children's services.
3. Service providers maintain distinct and categorical service definitions which
are frequently rigid and arbitrary. As a result it is difficult to match needs with
resources, especially in cases of the multi-need child .
The Karwacki Comm'n Report, supra note 69, at 41-42.
180. JSA 1980-84 Plan states:
Unfortunately, many of the youngsters under care are unsuitable for a regular
formal educational program. In addition, many of these youngsters are classified as
disruptive youth and have been suspended or expelled from schools. The difficulty in
placing a youngster in an educational program has made it difficult to maintain the
youngster in a community-based facility.
Id. at V-639.
181. MHA acknowledges the need for a mechanism to ensure that children who are the
responsibility of Social Services and Juvenile Services have adequate access to and care
from the Mental Hygiene Program by 1982. MHA Summary of the 1980/84 Plan at 18
(May 10, 1978). To date, however, they have not provided these psychological support serv-




Although the Maryland General Assembly has acknowledged that
these problems do exist, its response has been ineffective. It has estab-
lished an Office for Children and Youth 8 3 and an Office for the Coor-
dination of Services to the Handicapped 84 but neither of these
departments has any authority other than to make recommendations to
other agencies.' Nor are the problems such that they can be resolved
by the agencies themselves.' 86 Because each agency feels that it does
not have adequate fiscal resources to meet the needs of the multi-prob-
lem child, only the Legislature or Governor can insure that this prob-
lem is resolved. 87
E. Lack ofAccountabiliy
In Maryland no single agency has the responsibility for ensuring
that a child receives necessary services. In the past, the juvenile courts
tried to fill this void, but their ability to do so has been limited. For
example, courts often committed mentally handicapped children to the
joint custody of Social Services and Juvenile Services, thus pyramiding
the resources available for residential placements that did not fall
within either agency's rate structure. The State Department of Budget
and Fiscal Planning disapproved this practice in 1974,'88 thus cutting
182. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
183. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49D, §§ 1-5 (1979), amended by Act of May 10, 1983, Ch. 190,
1983 Md. Laws 837.
184. 1d. at art. 41, §§ 159-160 (1978).
185. Id. at art. 49D, § 3(6) (1979) amended by Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 190, 1983 Md.
Laws 837; Id. at art. 41, § 159(2)(b), § 160(b) (1978).
186. Through 1976, personnel from the Maryland State Department of Education,
Human Resources, and Health and Mental Hygiene attempted to formulate a memorandum
of collaboration to develop a mechanism for delivering services to handicapped children.
After the memorandum went through a series of drafts, Education finally determined that
legislation would be necessary to bring about the transfer of responsibility among the de-
partments which would more accurately and effectively reflect each department's actual
ability to provide needed services. Because the memorandum itself was not capable of mak-
ing the necessary changes, all the parties recommended mandatory legislation. Memo of
Collaboration, from F.X. McIntyre to Marion Monk, Ted Lucas, Ben White, and J. Kohn.
This legislation has not yet appeared.
187. See Draft Memo from Secretary of Dep't of Human Resources, Kalman R. Het-
tleman, to Governor Harry Hughes 3 (undated).
188. Letter from Richard Bandelin to Dep't of Human Resources Secretary David T.
Mason (May 15, 1974). This action by the Department of Budget and Fiscal Planning
(DBFP) appears to be in violation of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 244-256A (1978 & Supp. 1982). Provisions of that Act specifi-
cally direct state agencies to "publish notice" of their intention to change previously adopted
procedures and rules. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 245(c) (1978) (current version at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41, § 256F(i) (Supp. 1982)). The result of DBFP's letter was to change both Social
Services' and Juvenile Services' system of providing services to children without publishing
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off this avenue for matching needs to services.
More recently, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has prohib-
ited juvenile courts from using another tactic to assure that the agencies
meet handicapped children's needs--committing a child to a specific
placement or program at specified costs despite the agencies' fiscal re-
strictions. In Linda G., the Court of Special Appeals held a juvenile
court "was without jurisdiction to direct the Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene to shoulder the responsibility for Linda's care and
treatment at Taylor Manor." '89 The statute spelling out the juvenile
court's disposition powers allows the court to give custody or guardian-
ship to a person "under terms the court deems appropriate" or to com-
mit a child to the custody or guardianship of a public or private
agency. 9 0 Because the language "under terms the court deems appro-
priate" does not appear in the section authorizing commitment to an
agency, the Court of Special Appeals reasoned that the legislature in-
tended the agencies to have absolute discretion in managing their
budgets and devising programs for children committed to their care.' 9'
This decision seems to envision the Juvenile Court acting primarily as a
sorter, with little more authority than the right to assign children to one
agency or another. 9 2
A recent federal court decision similarly dashed any hope that the
court might have authority to order particular services for handicapped
children as a constitutional matter. In Johnson v. Solomon, the federal
either the change itself or "notice of its intended action." Hence, the agencies failed to give
interested persons the opportunity to challenge the change in agency procedure, a direct
violation of the APA.
189. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Prince George's Co., 47 Md. App. at
441, 423 A.2d at 592.
190. Id. at 445, 423 A.2d at 593.
191. Id.
192. Although the juvenile court cannot, under Maryland's present legal structure, assure
that the state meets handicapped children's needs, the Maryland Education Article delegates
considerable authority to Special Education Hearing Boards. The Hearing Officers have
broad, discretionary powers over a particular handicapped child's placement. Specifically,
they may:
(1) Require a complete and independent diagnosis, evaluation and prescription of ed-
ucational programs. ...
(2) .. .Confirm, modify or reject any diagnosis, evaluation, educational program, or
exclusion or exemption of the child from school privileges and require alternate special
educational programs for the child.
MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8-415(c) (1978 & Supp. 1982).
The Department of Education, through its State Hearing Board, thus has wide rang-
ing and detailed authority over the residential placement of a handicapped child, as well as
the components of that placement. As noted earlier, however, usually children whose fami-




district court for the District of Maryland determined that the state did
not have a constitutional obligation to provide a continuum of services
ranging from foster care to residential treatment centers for mentally
handicapped children confined in mental hospitals. 93 With regard to
the need to develop or to purchase less restrictive alternatives, the court
concluded that many of these concerns were more suitably addressed to
the state legislature rather than the federal court. Based on these deter-
minations the court stated that:
While this court feels that Defendants have a duty to "explore and
provide the least stringent practicable alternatives" to the civil
commitment of juveniles,. . . this duty does not require a State to
create the best mental health system imaginable any more than a
State must create the best corrections system imaginable ...
Even one of the earliest advocates of the right to treatment has
recognized that public opinion must be relied upon to prod legisla-
tors to pass sufficient appropriations. .... 194
Moreover, there is no mandatory review of placements while a
child is under the custody of Juvenile Services. 95 Instead, Maryland
law leaves it to the child's attorney or the court to initiate formal review
of these placements.' 96 In most cases formal review does not occur.' 97
IV. CONCLUSION
The problems discussed in this Article have been apparent for
some time. Numerous commissions, committees, and task forces have
been formed to address them."98 In late 1977, the Governor's Commis-
sion on Funding the Education of Handicapped Children' 99 (the
193. Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979).
194. Id. at 305 (citations omitted).
195. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-826 (1980 & Supp. 1982) (requiring only
that the custodian file a periodic written progress report). MD. R.P. 916.
196. MD. R.P. 916b.
197. Lisa, for example, was "temporarily" placed at Montrose pending the arrangement
of an appropriate placement. During the nearly two years that Lisa spent at Montrose there
was no court review of her continued placement there. In fact, the only review of Lisa's
placement was instigated by Lisa herself. After one and a half years at Montrose, her "tem-
porary placement," she wrote the following letter to the Juvenile Court Master who had
presided at her delinquency hearing and had recommended that she be temporarily placed
at Montrose:
"Dear Mr.
I hate your. . . gutes [sic] Because you Will Not get me out of this. . . place
and this Do Not Mack [sic] . . . sence [sic] I Been in Montrose 1 year - I mothe [sic]
From the girl that you will not get out of this . . . place"
198. See J. BOYD, BACKGROUND REPORT ON THE COORDINATION OF CHILDREN'S SERV-
ICES (August 10, 1976) (prepared for the Governor's Commission on Juvenile Justice).
199. Schifter Comm'n Report at 1-23.
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Schifter Commission) published its report recommending that the leg-
islature mandate a full spectrum of services, instead of just educational
services, for handicapped youngsters. It also proposed the establish-
ment of a coordinated statewide approach to providing programs for
these children.2 °°
In keeping with that proposal, Acting Governor Blair Lee III cre-
ated the State Coordinating Committee on Services to Handicapped
Children.2 1' The Committee's responsibility was to recommend inter-
agency procedures to coordinate services to children who require pro-
grams in non-public facilities and to design administrative procedures
to implement other recommendations of the Schifter Commission.20 2
Thus far the State Coordinating Committee has concentrated on
formulating a program to coordinate agency responses to children who
require expensive residential treatment programs in non-public facili-
ties.2 3 This is an admirable project, but it ignores the reality that once
a child needs this level of services, the damage is severe and the prog-
nosis is poor." Lisa is a case in point. If the state wants to ensure that
we do not continue to create Lisas, it must change the present system
more radically. This will require legislative intervention.
The legislature should focus on four areas. First, it should explic-
200. Id. at 3, 15.
201. Executive Order No. 01.01.1978.07, MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 01, § 01.1978.07 (1978)
(amended by Executive Order No. 01.01.1979.17, MD. ADMIN. Code tit. 01, § 01.1979.17
(1979)).
202. Id.
203. The State Coordinating Committee entered into a contract with the Education Turn-
key System, Inc., to analyze the issues involved in interagency coordination. In September,
1981, Turnkey issued a two-volume report which made recommendations concerning the
establishment of local coordinating councils and a state coordinating council, the creation of
a common funding pool to be used for purchase of care in all non-public residential care
placements and delineation of case management responsibility. EDUCATION TURNKEY,
INC., PROGRAM POLICY AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS FOR IMPROVED SERVICES TO HANDI-
CAPPED CHILDREN (Sept. 16, 1981). By Executive Order 01.01.1982.09, the Governor has
since created the State Coordinating Council for Residential Placement of Handicapped
Children. This Counsel is to plan and supervise the multiple agency provision of services to
handicapped children requiring residential programs. See 9 Md. Admin. Reg. 1502 (1982).
204. As long as Maryland's system is reaction-oriented rather than prevention-oriented,
we always will be dealing with cases at their most difficult stages.
As Marian Wright Edelman, Director, Children's Defense Fund has stated:
The mentality reflected by some conservatives in Congress who . . . viewed a
maximum of $266 million authorization to keep children from being unnecessarily re-
moved from their homes and to help them gain a new family through adoption as an
"uncontrollable" entitlement must be turned around. We must find ways to convince
the public that such thinking not only hurts children but also burdens taxpayers, who
bear the cost of expensive remediation strategies when we fail to invest in children
when it matters most: before they get sick, drop out of school, or get into trouble.
Edelman, Who Is For Children? 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 109, 113 (1981).
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itly acknowledge that a child has a right to treatment keyed to her
needs whenever the state intervenes in her life, particularly if it takes
her from her family. Second, it should make this right a reality by
mandating home (social) and health services as well as educational
services.2" 5 Making a statutory commitment to providing children the
services they need would entail, of course, a greater financial commit-
ment to youngsters. But children are a society's most precious resource.
To turn our backs on them is to sabotage our future. Furthermore, if
we require the agencies to provide services when they are needed, we
can expect to save money-spending a little for a child to live in a
group home for a short time instead of spending much more for her to
be institutionalized for her entire life.
2 6
Third, the legislature should define agency responsibility in terms
of the services a child needs and not according to the child's label.2 °7
Dividing a complete spectrum of discrete services among the respective
agencies would eliminate the present wasteful duplication of services
and would permit the system better to mobilize agency expertise.
Moreover, such a reform would bring the system closer to fulfilling
children's right to have their needs met by ensuring that the appropri-
ate service both exists and is provided where needed. 20 ' Thus, Social
Services could be responsible for providing all family services, includ-
ing specialized foster care, and coordinating counseling services for
205. The Schifter Comm'n Report at 14.
206. Id.; see supra note 204.
207. An alternative to legislative reallocation of agency responsibility is to create a cabi-
net level Department for Children. The advantage is that there would be one central
spokesperson for children with direct access to the Governor. If one agency was ultimately
responsible for the most costly and restrictive forms of treatment there would be a greater
incentive within that agency to ensure that there are less restrictive forms of intervention
available.
The disadvantage to creating a Department for Children is that there is no guarantee
that creating a super-agency for children would ensure better services. For example, at pres-
ent under the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene there are the Juvenile Services
Administration, the Mental Retardation Administration, and the Mental Hygiene Adminis-
tration. Experience has shown that there is no more cooperation between these three admin-
istrations than between the Departments of Education and Human Resources, which are
separate departments. Moreover, it is politically unlikely that a Department for Children
would be created because it would entail taking authority away from three strong
departments.
208. Presently agency responsibility is defined in terms of the child's label or diagnosis.
But, as discussed previously, the label a child receives may be based on circumstances unre-
lated to the child's needs and invariably leads to inter-agency conflict and shirking of re-
sponsibility. See supra notes 125, 144-51 and accompanying text. Of course, reform would
be incomplete if it failed to provide for a more rational, need-based intervention system.
Wholesale revision of the current intervention system, however, raises numerous and com-
plex issues that are beyond the scope of this Article.
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families and support services such as respite care, daycare, and intense
home supervision services. 2" Social Services as opposed to Juvenile
Services would serve children who are now labeled as CINS because
these ungovernable, unmanageable kids usually live in troubled fami-
lies. Under the proposed system, the emphasis would be transferred
from the child to the family that needs supportive services. 2 '0 Juvenile
Services would provide all nonspecialized group care for children un-
able to remain in their home or to live in foster homes. The Mental
Hygiene and Mental Retardation Administrations could be required to
provide therapeutic group homes and public residential programs for
all handicapped children needing those services. 2 11 The Department of
Education would fund all private residential programs.2" 2
Finally, the legislature should augment the powers of the juvenile
court so that it could enforce a child's right to treatment.21 3 The court
must be able to order an agency to provide a specific program or serv-
ice; otherwise, the right to treatment based on need would again be-
come illusory. If Marylanders truly believe that children are our most
precious resource 2 4 and if we hope to teach children to respect our
legal system, we must show these children that the system is just. Our
present system is not, and "[iun the little world in which children have
their existence, whosoever brings them up, there is nothing so finely
209. Because Social Services would be responsible for home and family services does not
mean that it would have to provide these services directly. Rather, it could contract with
private non-profit providers in the community who have extensive experience working with
handicapped children and their families.
210. See JSA Planning Policy for CINS at 3.
211. Mental Retardation and Mental Hygiene are responsible for funding and supervis-
ing group homes for the over-21 population. Because of their expertise, they should also be
responsible for handicapped children needing this service.
212. If there were group homes and supportive services for children in the community,
then the only children needing private residential programs would be those children who,
because of their handicap, need 24-hour special education programming and personal care.
Education is required to provide services for these children and thus should supply full
funding for these placements. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13A, § 05.01.06.E(3)(f) (1978). More-
over, for those children needing residential services because of intertwining needs, courts
have consistently held Education responsible for funding. See supra note 104.
213. See The Family Court Act § 255, N.Y. Jud. Law § 255 (McKinney 1975). See also
Fisher, "Families with Service Needs" The Newest Euphemism? 18 J. FAM. L. 1, 48-59 (1979-
80).
214. As the late President John F. Kennedy once stated:
Children are the world's most valuable resource and its best hope for the future. It is a
real tragedy that in an era of vast technological progress and scientific achievement
millions of children should still suffer from lack of medical care, proper nutrition, ade-
quate education and be subjected to the handicaps and uncertainties of a low income,
substandard environment.
John F. Kennedy, Washington, D.C. (July 25, 1963), reprinted in THE QUOTABLE KENNEDY
29 (A. Goldman ed. 1965).
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felt, as injustice." '215
215. C. DICKENS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS 57 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1966) (1st ed.
London 1861).
